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1 Introduction
THIS THESIS CONSIDERS THE PROBLEM of non-existence of compet­
itive equilibria in exchange economies. When equilibria fail to exist, prices 
fail to allocate commodities across individuals in such a way that markets 
clear. This is the most fundamental of all market failures.
The classical theorem on the existence of competitive equilibrium dates 
back to the 1950’s, when it was proved in various guises by Arrow and Debreu 
(1954), Debreu (1956, 1959), Gale (1955), Kuhn (1956), McKenzie (1954, 
1955, 1959), and Nikaido (1956). Major predecessors of these papers were 
Wald (1935, 1936) and von Neumann (1937). Wald was first to demonstrate 
the existence o f a meaningful solution to the Walrasian system of equations. 
Using an assumption which has since been termed the weak axiom of revealed 
preference, and which effectively reduces the set of consumers to one, Wald’s 
proof involves a simple maximisation problem. With many consumers with 
independent preferences however fixed point methods are needed (as shown in 
Uzawa (1962)). Although von Neumann’s paper is not concerned with com­
petitive equilibrium in the classical sense, he was the first to use a fixed point 
theorem for an existence argument in economics, and provided the generali­
sation of the Brouwer fixed point theorem, which is the major mathematical
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tool used in the classical existence proofs.
Since the 1950’s the proof of existence of competitive equilibria has under­
gone various major improvements, particularly in terms of the role and the 
formulation of the so called survival condition. The strong survival condition, 
or Slater assumption, states that every consumer can consume some bundle 
of goods in the interior of their consumption set without resorting to trade. 
Such a condition would be satisfied if each consumer’s initial endowment lay 
in the interior of their consumption set, which, if the consumption set corre­
sponds to the positive orthant, implies that each consumer is endowed with 
a positive amount of each commodity. Given the standard interpretation of 
a commodity in general equilibrium (that is, defined not only in terms of its 
physical characteristics, but also the date and location in which it is con­
sumed), the division of labour, and the spatial dispersion of economies, it is 
unrealistic to assume that individuals be endowed with positive amounts of 
all commodities, or indeed desire all commodities. However, it is now well 
known (see Arrow (1951)) that exchange economies with boundary endow­
ments (where individuals have zero endowments of some commodities) and 
weakly monotone preferences may fail to have competitive equilibria. The 
use of fixed point theorems in the classical proof of existence of competi­
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tive equilibria requires that the demand correspondences of individuals be 
non-empty, convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous in prices.2 To guar­
antee that demand correspondences possess these properties, it is sufficient 
that the utility functions of individuals be continuous and quasi-concave, 
and that budget sets be continuous in prices. If individuals have interior 
endowments, and prices lie in the unit simplex, budget correspondences are 
indeed continuous. However, when individuals have boundary endowments, 
the budget correspondence may fail to be lower hemi-continuous along those 
sequences of prices that converge to the boundary of the simplex. In par­
ticular, if at the limit an individual has zero income, this would imply that 
demand correspondences fail to be upper hemi-continuous in prices.
To illustrate the problem caused by boundary endowments and weakly 
monotone preferences, consider the following economy which, despite satis­
fying standard Arrow-Debreu assumptions, has no competitive equilibria.
E xam ple 1 Consider a pure exchange economy with no production, in which
2This property is often referred to as the closed graph property. The graph of a corre­
spondence /  : X  —i Y  is the set (x,y)  such that y 6 / (r ). Upper hemi-continuity requires 
that for any x, and for any open set O, that contains x  there exists some neighbourhood N 
of x such that f (x ' )  C O if x' € N. The closed graph property, on the other hand, requires 
that for any two sequences xm -> x e  X  and ym —► y, with x m 6 X  and ym € f ( x m) 
for every m, we have y €  / ( x ) .  These two concepts coincide if the range of /  is compact 
and / ( x )  is closed for each x, conditions which are generally satisfied when applying fixed 
point theorems (see e.g. Green and Heller (1981)).
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there are two commodities, L -  {1 ,2 }, and two individuals, I  =  {1 ,2 }, 
with consumption sets X 1 =  X 2 =  R\, preferences u1 =  x\, u2 =  x\, and 
endowments wl =  (1,0), w2 =  (1,1). Let pt denote the price of commodity 
l. Individual 2 ’s demand for commodity 2 is , and since Wi =  1, there 
are no prices which clear markets.
The problem here is that there are price vectors, p £ / { 0 } ,  at which the
set { x  £ X 1 : px <  pw1} has an empty interior. The strong survival condition 
prevents the possibility of minimum-wealth situations. We could modify the 
above example to satisfy the condition by increasing individual l ’s endow­
ment of commodity 2 by one unit, thereby ensuring upper hemi-continuity of 
demand correspondences. A competitive equilibrium would then exist with 
Pi — P2 and x 1 =  (2, 0 ),x2 =  (0,2). In practice however, most consumers 
only have one commodity to sell, their labour. One could argue therefore 
that the strong survival condition is almost never satisfied. Alternatively, we 
could make individuals’ preferences strongly monotone. This would imply 
that all prices must be strictly positive, thereby guaranteeing that all indi­
viduals have positive income. With the preferences u' =  x{ +  x\ for example, 
a competitive equilibrium exists with p\ =  p2 and x 1 =  (1,0), x2 =  (1,1). 
However, as already noted, it is not reasonable to assume that individuals
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desire all commodities.
McKenzie (1959, 1961), generalising a concept of Gale (1955), proposed 
a way of overcoming the existence problem, which allows the possibility of 
weakly monotone preferences and boundary endowments. He studied irre­
ducible exchange economies. “In loose terms, an economy is irreducible if it 
cannot be divided into two groups of consumers where one group is unable 
to supply any goods which the other group wants.” 3 McKenzie presents an 
existence proof in two stages. First, he uses fixed point theorems to prove 
the existence of a quasi-equilibrium (formally defined by Debreu (1962)). A 
quasi-equilibrium differs from a competitive equilibrium only in so far as the 
utility maximising requirement of individuals is replaced by a cost minimising 
requirement. A competitive equilibrium is by definition a quasi-equilibrium, 
but the reverse is not necessarily true. Under standard assumptions, a quasi­
equilibrium exists but a competitive equilibrium may not, since with weakly 
monotone preferences and boundary endowments there is no guarantee that 
every consumer can participate with a budget of positive value4 in the neigh­
bourhood of equilibrium. However, McKenzie shows that with the additional 
requirement that the economy be irreducible, any quasi-equilibrium is indeed
3McKenzie (1959)
4Negative value in the case o f net trades.
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a competitive equilibrium. The irreducibility assumption states that however 
the set of individuals be partitioned into two groups, {1 ,2 }, then at any fea­
sible allocation for the economy, there is some feasible net trade available to 
group 2, which when added to the allocation of group 1 leaves all individuals 
in group 1 at least as well off and at least one individual in group 1 strictly 
better off. (Note that the addition of the net trade may imply individuals 
in the first group supplying as well as receiving commodities). Since irre­
ducibility must hold for any partition of the set of individuals, group 1 may 
consist of one arbitrarily chosen individual. Under standard assumptions, 
it can be shown that at a quasi-equilibrium there is some individual with 
positive income. Let group 1 consist of this individual and group 2 all other 
individuals. Irreducibility implies that there is a net trade available to group 
2 which makes the individual in group 1 strictly better off. Therefore, there 
is some individual in group 2 with positive income. In fact, irreducibility 
ensures that if any one individual has positive income (which is true at a 
quasi-equilibrium), then so will all other individuals in the economy. That 
is, an irreducible economy has a competitive equilibrium.
Following McKenzie’s seminal papers, Arrow and Hahn (1971) proposed 
an alternative to irreducibility, namely resource relatedness. "... household
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h' is resource related  to household h" if some increase in those assets held 
by household h' in some positive amounts can be used in a reallocation of 
the entire economy so that no household is worse off and household h" is 
strictly better off.5” The only property of household hi which is relevant in 
this definition is a list of the commodities which he/she can supply positive 
amounts of, and the only relevant property of household h" is their utility 
function. It is possible, with this definition, that hi"s welfare be directly or 
only very indirectly improved through the addition of these commodities. It 
may be that these commodities enter hi"s utility function directly. Alter­
natively, they may be factors of production used to produce commodities 
that enter h"'s utility function. On the other hand, they may be employed 
to produce commodities which enter some individual h i"'s utility function, 
allowing hi" to give up the consumption of some other commodity - thus 
maintaining utility o f h"‘ constant - which does enter hi"s utility function 
directly. The definition implies that if any household hi is resource related 
to a household h" with positive income, then hi itself has positive income. If 
any household hi is resource related to a household which is resource related 
to a household which is resource related to a household h" - that is, if hi
5Arrow and Hahn (1971)
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is indirectly resource related to h" - which has positive income, then h! also 
has positive income. Arrow and Hahn show that if every household (or in­
dividual) is indirectly resource related to every other household, then if one 
household has positive income at prices p, then so do all other households. 
Resource relatedness therefore guarantees that under standard assumptions 
a competitive equilibrium exists.
Although relaxing the strong survival condition, both McKenzie and Ar­
row and Hahn rely on a weak survival assumption, otherwise known as the 
autarchy assumption, to prove existence of competitive equilibria. This as­
sumption states that every consumer can consume some bundle of goods in 
their consumption set without trade. This implies that an individual’s en­
dowment is an element of their consumption set, clearly a restrictive assump­
tion. Moore (1975) further weakens the endowment assumption, showing 
that the requirement that individuals may survive without trade is superflu­
ous for an irreducible economy. He proves existence in economies in which 
consumers must rely on trade to achieve a feasible commodity bundle.
In economies with complete markets the irreducibility condition is al­
ways satisfied if preferences are strictly monotone. However, this is no longer 
true with incomplete asset markets, since the incompleteness of the market
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may limit the possibility of agents attaining some feasible transactions. The 
majority of papers in the incomplete markets literature rely then, for exis­
tence, on the assumption that every agent's endowment lie in the interior of 
his/her consumption set. In finite pure exchange economies with incomplete 
asset markets and with no restriction on endowments, Gottardi and Hens 
(1996) propose an extension of the irreducibility condition to prove the exis­
tence of a competitive equilibrium. The key innovation of their paper is that 
the irreducibility condition is reformulated to account for the restrictions on 
transferring wealth across possible states of nature. Their condition requires 
that however the set of individuals be partitioned into two groups, {1,2}, then 
at any feasible allocation for the economy, there is some feasible net trade 
available to group 2, which, taking into account the constraints imposed by 
the asset market structure, can be added to the allocation of group 1, such 
that all individuals in group 1 are at least as well off and at least one indi­
vidual in group 1 is strictly better off. The authors consider a pure exchange 
economy satisfying standard assumptions, in which individual preferences 
are strongly monotone, (an economy for which, with complete markets, com­
petitive equilibria exist with no restriction on endowments). They show that 
with incomplete markets, their irreducibility condition is sufficient for exis-
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tence; using illustrative examples to prove that in the absence of irreducibility 
existence of equilibria may fail.
In economies with a countable set of individuals and commodities Bal- 
asko, Cass and Shell (1980), Burke (1988), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 
(1991), and Wilson (1981) have also proposed different extensions of irre­
ducibility, to prove the existence of competitive equilibria in infinite dimen­
sional economies. The argument for the existence of competitive equilibria 
in infinite economies proceeds by considering a sequence of finite truncated 
economies which tend to the full economy in the limit. More specifically, 
the argument is to consider a convergent sequence of prices and a convergent 
sequence of feasible allocations, obtained from the competitive equilibria for 
a sequence of finite truncated economies, and to then show that the limits 
of these sequences constitute a competitive equilibrium for the full economy. 
To guarantee the existence of such sequences, one can impose some survival 
condition directly on the full economy (Burke (1988), Geanakoplos and Pole­
marchakis (1991)) and/or one can assume some form of irreducibility for the 
truncated economies (Balasko, Cass and Shell (1980), Wilson (1981)). Wil­
son (1981) imposes McKenzie’s irreducibility condition on the entire economy, 
and also assumes the existence o f a collection of finite sub-economies, each
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of which is irreducible. This guarantees competitive equilibria for the sub­
economies and ensures that their limit constitute a competitive equilibrium 
for the entire economy. Balasko, Cass and Shell (1980) assume irreducibil­
ity of the finite truncated economies only. However, although not explicitly 
brought out in their paper, their intertemporal irreducibility condition is such 
that it necessarily implies irreducibility of the full economy. Burke (1988) re­
fines the existence proof techniques of these earlier authors to eliminate what 
he deems to be an “unnatural sub-economy irreducibility assumption.6” He 
assumes irreducibility of the full economy only. In order to guarantee the ex­
istence of competitive equilibria for a sequence of finite truncated economies, 
he perturbs individual endowments to be strictly positive, shrinking the per­
turbations to zero so that the limit of the perturbed economy equilibria 
constitutes a competitive equilibrium for the initial unperturbed economy. 
However, since the perturbation of endowments is not necessarily limited to 
finitely many commodities, showing that the perturbation vanishes at the 
limit is very involved. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991) follow Burke’s 
approach of imposing irreducibility on the full economy alone, but simplify 
the existence argument by perturbing utility functions as well as endowments
Burke (1988)
Irreducibility in Exchange Economies 15
in the finite truncated economies. This allows them to perturb endowments 
in only one commodity, thus simplifying the limiting argument.
Each of the survival conditions proposed in the literature is framed very 
differently, and implies different restrictions on the underlying fundamentals 
of the economy. This raises the question of the relationship between alterna­
tive survival conditions, but more importantly, and this is the main contri­
bution of the thesis, what are the key restrictions to guarantee the existence 
of competitive equilibria in each of these General Equilibrium frameworks.
The key innovation of this thesis is the use of graph theory to develop con­
ditions which guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria in economies 
with boundary endowments. Moreover, we develop weaker irreducibility con­
ditions than any proposed in the existing literature. The graph theoretic 
approach is very intuitive. To each exchange economy at each vector of 
prices, we associate a price graph, in which each individual is represented 
by a vertex, and directed arcs between vertices represent a particular rela­
tionship between the associated individuals. More specifically, the existence 
of a directed arc between vertices implies a certain coincidence of the pref­
erences and endowments of the individuals concerned. Roughly speaking, 
given a price vector, a directed arc between individuals i and j  exists when
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(a) individual i is a member of some set of individuals who can supply com­
modities which j  desires at any utility maximizing affordable feasible bundle, 
and (b) however we partition the set of individuals in (a) into two groups, 
the group containing i can supply commodities which are desired by some 
individual (at any of their utility maximizing affordable feasible bundles) in 
the other group. A graph is said to be strongly connected if for each pair 
of vertices, there is a path of arcs linking the first to the second and vice 
versa. Let C denote the collection of price graphs of an economy at every 
vector of prices. An economy is said to be C-irreducible if each member of 
C  is strongly connected. Given that strong connectedness of the graph is 
required at all vectors of prices, it follows that C-irreducibility is a condition 
on preferences, consumption sets and technology, and not on prices. Un­
der standard assumptions, C-irreducibility is a sufficient condition for the 
existence of a competitive equilibrium.
The added appeal of C-irreducibility over either irreducibility or resource 
relatedness is two-fold. Firstly, C-irreducibility does not require that in­
dividual preferences be strongly quasi-concave. Secondly, C-irreducibility 
allows an operational method for testing using computational algorithms.
While McKenzie’s definition needs to be checked at each of a continuum of
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feasible allocations, C-irreducibility need only be checked for a finite set of 
graphs. For small models, these graphs may be inferred and strong con­
nectedness determined by inspection. For large, more complex models, this 
procedure is obviously problematic. However, even with such large models, 
C-irreducibility lends itself to testability, where irreducibility does not. The 
adjacency matrix of an economy graph can easily be constructed using the 
relevant index sets of the economy. Entries in the matrix are zeros and ones, 
where a one implies the existence of a directed arc between associated ver­
tices and zeros signify the absence of arcs. There are well-known efficient 
computational algorithms which can be used to test for the irreducibility of 
the adjacency matrix, which implies strong connectedness of the economy 
graph.
One of the virtues of a graph theoretic approach is that it allows one 
to abstract away from the economics. Translating the survival conditions 
presented in the literature into restrictions on graphs, one can determine 
relationships between them, previously obscured by their economic formu­
lation. We characterize both McKenzie’s (1961) irreducibility and Arrow 
and Hahn’s (1971) resource relatedness in terms of restrictions on graphs. 
Our first observation is that irreducibility and C-irreducibility are differ-
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ent conditions, in that neither implies the other. However, the nature of 
this difference suggests a particular modification in the definition of an arc 
in the price graph to generate an alternative condition - which we call C1- 
irreducibility - which is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibria 
for a significantly larger class of economies than McKenzie’s irreducibility. 
C'-irreducibility is obtained from C-irreducibility by adding a second type of 
arc, implying a slightly different relationship between associated individuals. 
While irreducibility requires a particular relationship to hold between every 
pair of individuals at all feasible allocations, C'-irreducibility only requires 
a relationship to hold between every pair of individuals for some subset of 
feasible allocations, which always contains the quasi-equilibrium allocations.
It is well known (see McKenzie (1981)) that resource relatedness implies 
irreducibility, but the reverse relationship is far from obvious. However, here 
we are able to provide conditions under which the two definitions are equiv­
alent7. Therefore, we are able to conclude that under standard assumptions, 
C'-irreducibility is weaker than irreducibility, which is in turn weaker than 
resource relatedness.
In the third chapter, we extend the analysis to pure exchange economies 
7This answers an open question in the existing literature (see McKenzie (1981)).
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with incomplete asset markets. Although the notion of a price graph extends 
trivially to such economies, the incompleteness of asset markets presents sev­
eral issues of substance. Even with the assumption o f strictly monotone 
preferences, C'-irreducibility does not guarantee the existence of competitive 
equilibria in economies with an incomplete set of asset markets, since the 
incompleteness of the market may limit the possibility of agents attaining 
some feasible transactions. Additional restrictions with respect to the com­
plete market case are therefore required. These are joint restrictions on the 
asset structure and the distribution of endowments and the preferences of 
individuals. By modifying the definition of C'-irreducibility to allow for the 
attainability of trades given the asset market structure, we obtain an anal­
ogous condition, C'-irreducibility, which guarantees existence for economies 
with incomplete markets. We show that C'-irreducibility is weaker than 
Gottardi and Hens’ (1996) alternative survival condition. Our final result in 
this section is to provide, using a graph theoretic characterisation, a suffi­
cient condition for an exchange economy with incomplete asset markets to 
be effectively complete.
In the fourth chapter, we study the consequences for the existence of com­
petitive equilibria, of individuals’ participation in markets being restricted
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in some way. In practice, individuals’ participation in markets is subject to 
a wide range o f diverse institutional restrictions. Age restrictions apply for 
the purchase o f cigarettes and alcohol. Commodities such as weapons and 
motorcycle insurance can only be purchased by registered license holders. 
In some countries, foreign nationals may be legally prevented from buying 
commodities such as domestic property. Wholesale markets are restricted to 
registered traders. Traders in futures markets face margin calls, where they 
have to put up shares to the value of their trades, imposing limits on short 
sales.
Formally, participation in markets is restricted when some reallocations 
of commodities are not attainable by some individuals at some commod­
ity prices. When participation is restricted, competitive equilibria may not 
exist, even if individuals have strongly monotone preferences. Inexistence 
is due to the discontinuous dependence of attainable allocations on prices. 
An economy with an incomplete set of asset markets is a special case of 
an economy with restricted participation, in which all individuals face the 
same participation constraints, and discontinuities in the correspondence of 
attainable allocations therefore occur at the same prices for all individuals. 
On the other hand, when market participation is restricted in such a way
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that different individuals have access to different attainable allocations, dis­
continuities occur at different commodity prices for different individuals. In 
effect, prices must perform a dual role. Not only must they adjust to attain 
market clearing, but also to ensure that the net demands of unrestricted 
individuals in each market be consistent with the limits imposed by other 
individuals’ participation in the market being restricted.
Existence of equilibria in economies with restricted participation in asset 
markets has been studied by Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990), - who con­
sider linear homogeneous constraints on asset holdings, - Polemarchakis and 
Siconolfi (1997), - who consider an incomplete asset market economy with 
asset payoffs denominated in multiple commodities with individuals facing 
asymmetric linear constraints on portfolio incomes, - and Cass, Siconolfi 
and Villanacci (2001), - who modify the Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990) 
model to allow for any smooth, quasi-concave inequality constraints8. In 
each of these papers, existence of equilibrium is demonstrated for the case in 
which individuals have interior endowments. We consider a pure exchange 
economy without uncertainty, in which individuals face linear homogeneous 
constraints on participation in markets. Individuals are assumed to have 
sEarlier contributions in this area are due to Siconolfi (1986, 1989).
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strongly monotone preferences and boundary endowments. Our formulation 
therefore characterises economies in which, without restricted participation, 
competitive equilibria exist under standard assumptions. We show that when 
participation in markets is restricted, additional conditions are required to 
ensure existence with boundary endowments. In particular, some form of 
C-irreducibility condition is required. This condition must be formulated 
to take into account the restrictions on net trades imposed. Robust non­
existence examples illustrate that our characterisation is tight, that is, with­
out our survival condition, existence of competitive equilibria may fail.
In the final chapter we study irreducibility in pure exchange economies 
with countable sets of individuals and economies. The argument for the ex­
istence of competitive equilibria in infinite dimensional economies proceeds 
by considering a sequence of finite truncated economies which tend to the 
full economy in the limit. Existence is established by proving that the limit 
of a sequence o f prices and allocations, corresponding to the competitive 
equilibria of the finite truncated economies, constitutes a competitive equi­
librium for the full economy. In the literature, authors assumed irreducibility 
of the full economy (Burke (1988); Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991)) 
and/or imposed some form of irreducibility condition on the finite truncated
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economies, (Wilson (1981); Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980)).
We consider a sequence of finite truncated economies which converge to 
the full exchange economy in the limit. To this sequence we associate a se­
quence of price graphs. Modifying the definition of C-irreducibility to allow 
for a countable infinity of individuals, we illustrate via an example that an 
economy which is the limit of some sequence of finite C-irreducible economies 
(a sequentially C-irreducible economy) will not necessarily be C-irreducible. 
The implication of this result is that it is not sufficient for the existence 
of competitive equilibria to impose the C-irreducibility condition on the fi­
nite truncated subeconomies alone. However, by deriving conditions under 
which an increasing sequence of strongly connected graphs will converge to 
a graph which is itself strongly connected, we are able to provide conditions 
under which sequential C-irreducibility does indeed imply C-irreducibility. 
Essentially, the condition implies that the preferences and endowments of 
individuals be such that the economy can be approximated by an increasing 
sequence of finite truncated economies in which links between individuals in 
any given finite economy cannot be arbitrarily broken as “new” individuals 
are introduced. Next we show by an example that a C-irreducible economy 
may not necessarily be approximated by any sequence of finite C-irreducible
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economies. Finally, by deriving conditions under which a strongly connected 
infinite graph can be approximated by a sequence of finite strongly connected 
graphs, we are able to provide a condition on the collection of price graphs 
of the full economy to guarantee the existence of some sequence of finite C- 
irreducible economies, which has the full economy as its unique limit. The 
key restriction here is that there must be sufficient arcs across truncated 
economies. The results of this chapter, lead us to conclude that when work­
ing with infinite dimensional economies it is far less restrictive to prove the 
existence of competitive equilibria by imposing some form of irreducibility 
condition on the full economy alone.
The use of graph theory in general equilibrium analysis has been explored 
by Rosenblatt (1957), Eaves (1985), and more recently Maxfield (1997). 
Rosenblatt develops results for the properties of the graphs of Minkowski- 
Leontief matrices (a finite nonnegative square matrix A  such that each row 
sum is less than or equal to 1) to provide a complete characterisation of so­
lutions to linear input-output models. In an input-output model, entries in a 
Minkowski-Leontief matrix represent input-dependencies between industries. 
In the graph theoretic representation, vertices represent industries, and a di­
rected arc ViVj exists if and only if industry i purchases or procures input from
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industry j . Circular flows - a la Quesnay ( “Analyse du tableau economique” ) 
- and feed-back input-dependencies between industries are captured by what 
Rosenblatt calls cyclic nets, which are in fact strongly connected subgraphs. 
A cyclic net H of a graph G is said to be closed if (a) every cyclic net of G 
is either a subgraph of H or has no vertex in common with H , and (b) every 
vertex of G which is attainable from a vertex in H  is contained in the vertex 
set o f H . In figure 1 over leaf, although H is a closed cyclic net of G, H' is 
not since V2 is not an element o f the vertex set of H' but is attainable from 
vertices in H'.
Rosenblatt shows that if the Minkowski-Leontief matrix contains no null 
rows - which in terms of the graph-theoretic representation implies that each 
vertex is connected to at least one other vertex - then the associated graph 
contains at least one closed cyclic net. It follows then that either the graph 
itself is a closed cyclic net, in which case each industry is connected to every 
other industry, or else all closed cyclic nets are proper subgraphs, in which 
case the economy can be decomposed into distinct sub-economies, where at 
least one sub-economy is strongly connected. Using results from the theory of 
finite-dimensional stationary Markov chains (with a discrete time parameter), 
the author proves that solutions to the input-output system always exist
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Figure 1:
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in which only industries in strongly connected sub-economies operate at a 
positive level of activity.
Eaves (1985) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence 
of competitive equilibria in pure exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas util­
ities. Although the author does not explicitly appeal to graph theoretic 
techniques, he develops properties of matrices which have a graph theoretic 
interpretation. He demonstrates that an equilibrium exists in his model if 
and only if the matrix formed from the product of the endowment matrix 
and the transpose of the matrix of utility exponents has what he calls “sym­
metric access.” A commodity l is said to access a commodity /' / if there
exists some sequence of commodities { / =  gx, g2, ..., gnt..., =  / ' }  and some
sequence of individuals { i i ,  *2 ,..., im, I m )  such that agent im is endowed 
with commodity gn and desires commodity gn+i for n =  1,..., N. The matrix 
has symmetric access if for every pair of commodities either they access each 
other or neither accesses the other. A sufficient condition for the existence 
of a competitive equilibrium is that the matrix have full access, that is, each 
commodity accesses the other.
Work most closely related to this thesis is Maxfield (1997). Maxfield also 
uses graph theory to provide results for weakening the interior endowment
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assumption of Arrow and Debreu, in finite economies. He obtains similar 
results to those reported here in section 2.3.1 of chapter 2, but for a limited 
class of economic models. He defines an economy graph in which vertices 
represent individuals and firms, and arcs link the sources of commodities 
and profits to users of commodities and recipients of profits. An arc exists 
between two individuals when one has a tradeable endowment of at least one 
commodity for which the other is non-satiable. (According to Maxfield, an 
individual is non-satiable on a set of commodities L, if when the individual 
has strictly positive income and the price of any one commodity in the set 
L is non-positive, the individual demands an infinitely large amount of some 
commodity, not necessarily in L). An arc exists from an individual i to a firm 
k whenever either i has a tradeable endowment of at least one commodity 
which is a possible input to production for firm k, or i owns a positive 
share of profits of firm k. An arc exists from firm k to firm k' whenever 
k has at least one output commodity which is a possible input for firm k'. 
Finally, an arc exists between firm k and individual t whenever firm k has 
at least one output commodity for which i is non-satiable. Maxfield shows 
that strong connectedness of the economy graph is a sufficient condition 
for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Through examples, he shows
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that his alternative condition is neither stronger nor weaker than McKenzie’s 
irreducibility.
The layout of the rest of the thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, we present 
our results for finite production economies. In chapter 3 we extend the anal­
ysis to economies with an incomplete set of asset markets. In chapter 4, we 
study a more general model of restricted participation, with different indi­
viduals potentially having access to different subsets of markets. Finally, in 
chapter 5, we consider economies with countable sets of commodities and
individuals.
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2 Finite Production Economies9
2.1 Introduction
In this first chapter, we focus on finite production economies. In order to 
prove the existence of competitive equilibria when individuals have weakly 
monotone preferences and boundary endowments, some condition is required 
to ensure that at any given prices, if at least one individual in the economy 
has positive income, then so do all the others, which then guarantees that 
any quasi-equilibrium is also a competitive equilibrium for the economy. To 
this effect, McKenzie (1959,1961) proposes a condition he calls irreducibility. 
Arrow and Hahn (1971) appeal to a similar condition, resource relatedness.
We apply graph theoretic notions - from the theory of finite directed 
graphs - to finite production economies to develop an alternative survival 
condition, C-irreducibility, which is also sufficient to guarantee that at quasi­
equilibrium prices each individual’s budget set has a non-empty interior. C- 
irreducibility is therefore a sufficient condition for the existence of competitive 
equilibria, under standard Arrow-Debreu assumptions, when individuals have 
weakly monotone preferences and boundary endowments. The added appeal
9This ch ap ter is co -a u th ored  w ith  Sayantan G hosal.
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of C-irreducibility over either irreducibility or resource relatedness is two­
fold. Firstly, C-irreducibility does not require that individual preferences 
be strongly quasi-concave. Secondly, C-irreducibility allows an operational 
method for testing using well-known efficient computational algorithms.
It is well known that resource relatedness implies irreducibility. How­
ever, the relative merits of C-irreducibility and irreducibility, in terms of 
the class of economies for which each is sufficient for existence, is unclear 
in that neither implies the other. By reinterpreting the irreducibility condi­
tion in terms of restrictions on graphs, we are able to highlight a particular 
modification in the definition o f C-irreducibility, to generate an alternative 
survival condition (for want o f a better name we call it C'-irreducibility), 
sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibria for a substantially larger 
class of economies than McKenzie’s irreducibility. The sense in which C'- 
irreducibility is weaker than irreducibility is that whereas irreducibility re­
quires a particular relationship to hold between every pair of individuals at 
every feasible allocation, C'-irreducibility only requires a relationship to hold 
between any pair of individuals for some subset of feasible allocations, which 
contains the set of quasi-equilibrium allocations.
The layout of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.2 we present our exten-
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sions of certain basic definitions and results from the theory of finite directed 
graphs. Whilst many of the results of this section are standard, a number of 
the lemmas are original and have been developed especially for our analysis of 
exchange economies. In section 2.3.1, we apply the graph theoretic notions to 
a standard finite production economy. Here we develop our C-irreducibility 
condition, and use it to prove the existence of competitive equilibria. In 
section 2.3.2, we highlight the relationship between C-irreducibility and ir­
reducibility, and present the weaker condition of C'-irreducibility. We show 
that irreducibility implies C'-irreducibility, and demonstrate by an example 
that the reverse is not necessarily true. In section 2.3.3 we compare irre­
ducibility and resource relatedness. Characterising each of these conditions 
in terms of restrictions on graphs allows us to derive conditions under which 
they are in fact equivalent. Finally, in section 2.4 we briefly conclude the 
results of the chapter.
2.2 Properties of directed graphs
This section extends some basic definitions and results from the theory of fi­
nite directed graphs (see for example Harary, Norman and Cartwright (1965), 
or Busacker and Saaty (1965)).
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D efin ition  2 (directed graph) Let V be a non-empty set whose elements may 
be labelled V{,i =  and let A be a binary relation on V, that is, a set
of ordered pairs of elements o f V . The pair T =  (V, A), where elements of
V are vertices and elements o f A are arcs, is called a directed graph. An arc 
directed from v, to Vj is denoted ViVj.
D efin ition  3 (path) A path in a directed graph is an ordered collection of 
arcs and vertices {va, ait Vi,..., a„, vn} in which each arc a* is v,-[V,, and all 
vertices are distinct.
D efin ition  4 (strongly connected graph) A directed graph is strongly con­
nected if for every pair of distinct vertices (v,, vf) there exists a path connect­
ing Vi to Vj and a path connecting Vj to v,.
Note that there are a number of ways in which a graph with vertex set
V  may be strongly connected. For example, figure 2 shows four distinct 
strongly connected graphs, each with the same vertex set V  =  {v i,t/2,V3}.
Consider a directed graph T =  (V, A) and let V 1 and V 2 be such that 
Vk c  V , k =  1,2, and V\ fl Vi =  0. An arc directed from Vito V2 is said to 
exist if there is v, e  Vj and Vj € V2 such that the arc V{Vj e  A.
Lem m a 5 A directed graph is strongly connected if and only if for every
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non-trivial vertex partitioning { V 1 , V 2} there exists at least one arc directed 
from V 1 to V 2and at least one arc directed from V 2 to V 1.
Proof. Suppose that for some vertex partitioning { V l , V 2} there is no 
arc directed from V 1 to V 2. Then there can be no path from any vertex in 
V 1 to any vertex in V2, and therefore the graph is not strongly connected. 
Conversely, suppose that the graph is not strongly connected. Then there 
are two vertices and v3 in the graph such that no path exists from v, to Vj. 
Consider the vertex partitioning { P 1, V 2}  such that V 1 be the set of vertices 
containing Vi and all vertices to which there exists a path directed from vx. 
Then there exist no arcs directed from P 1 to V2. ■
Definition 6 (irreducible adjacency matrix) The adjacency matrix of a di­
rected graph F is an N  x N (uihere N is the number of vertices in V )  nonneg­
ative matrix Mr =  [my], where my =  0  i f  vxv3 £ F, and my =  1 if vxv} S T. 
Let Mp =  [my] denote the kth power o f Mp. The adjacency matrix Mp is 
irreducible if for every pair, i , j ,  of its index set, there exists a positive inte­
ger a =  a ( i , j )  such that m“  > 0. Equivalently, the adjacency matrix Mp is 
irreducible if for every pair, i , j ,  there exists a sequence (io,*i,*2 . ■■■, Ik ), for  
K  >  1 , (where io =  i, and i/< =  j )  from the index set {1, 2,..., N } such that
m u l m i l i2 . . . m iK _ 2iK _ l m i K _ l j  >  0.
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Lemma 7 A directed graph T is strongly connected if and only if the adja­
cency matrix Mp is irreducible.
Proof. By definition, the adjacency matrix is irreducible if and only if 
mifcU+i =  1, for all ik in the sequence. Given the way the adjacency matrix 
is constructed, mj4jt+1 =  1 if and only if there exists a directed arc from 
ik to ik + 1 in the associated graph. Therefore, >
0 implies that there exists a path from i to j .  Since irreducibility of the 
adjacency matrix requires that this be the case for all i , j ,  the associated 
graph is strongly connected if and only if the adjacency matrix is irreducible.
Definition 8  (subgraph)  If V ' C V and A' C A, then F  =  (V", A') is a 
subgraph of T =  (V, A).
Definition 9 (spanning subgraph) A spanning subgraph F =  (V',A')  C T = 
(V,A) is a subgraph with the same set of vertices, i.e. V' =  V.
Lemma 10 Every strongly connected directed graph has at least one span­
ning subgraph which is strongly connected.
Proof. It suffices to note that every strongly connected directed graph 
contains the strongly connected spanning subgraph which is the graph itself.
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Figure 3:
D efinition 11 (cycle) A cycle is a path in which the initial vertex and the 
terminal vertex are the same.
Definition 1 2  (spanning cycle) A spanning cycle is a cycle which features 
all v €  V .
Figure 3, illustrates a spanning cycle for a graph with vertex set {u i, v?, 113, V4 }. 
Lem m a 13 The least number of arcs required to strongly connect a directed
graph with n vertices is n.
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P roof. Consider a set of vertices V. Let Ay be a collection of arcs 
which strongly connects V such that there is exactly one arc between any 
two distinct vertices d, and Vj. Then V =  (V, Ay) is a spanning cycle and is 
strongly connected. Therefore, if any Vi € V  is removed, then the arcs tij-iUj 
and ViVi+i are also removed. The graph T =  (V/vi, A v  / {vi-\Vi, tw + i} )  fails 
to be strongly connected. ■
2.3 Economies and graphs
2.3.1 C-irreducibility and competitive equilibria
Consider an exchange economy E, with individuals denoted by i £ I =  
{1 ,..., / } ,  firms denoted by k e  K  =  {1,..., K },  and commodities denoted by 
/ £ L =  {1 ,..., L }, where / ,  K, and L are non-empty, finite sets.
The commodity space, denoted 3 is the Euclidean space with dimension 
equal to the number of commodities.
Trades in commodities are denoted by, z =  ( z ! , ..., zl) € 3i£'.
An individual, i, is characterized by a pair, (Z\ u ‘ ), of a feasible trade 
set, Z* C 9? ,^ and a utility function, u' : Z' —¥ 3R.
For any non-empty subset of the set of individuals /  C I, let Z 1
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The aggregate domain of trades in commodities is denoted Z.
Each firm has a production set X k C Rl, where an element x k € X k is a 
netput vector. Let X  = J2k=i ^ * denote the aggregate production set.
At various points in the paper we will indicate the use of some or all of 
the following assumptions.
A1 For each i €  I , the set of feasible trades, Z x, is closed, convex, bounded 
below, (3z* £ Z' : z* < 0, z‘ ^  0, z* > z’ Vz‘ e  Z',and z' <SC z‘ Vz' ^
Z') and allows for free disposal (z € Z', z' >  z => z' £ Zx).
A2 Autarchy is feasible (0 6  Z').
A3 The utility function, ul, is continuous.
A4 The utility function, u1, is quasi-concave (u'(z') > u'(z) u'(Xz' +  (1 — 
A)z) > u ^ z), 0 <  A < 1).
A 5 The utility function, ul, satisfies local non-satiation, (Vz € Zx, Ve > 0, 
{z' e  Zx : u*(z/) > u*(z), | z‘ -  z |< e} #  0).
A 6 The utility function, ux, is weakly monotonically increasing (Vz £ Z x, 
z' >  z => u'(z') >  ux(z)).
A7 X  is a closed convex cone.
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The assumption that X be a closed convex cone can be shown to be 
mathematically equivalent to the assumption that firms production sets be 
convex, by introducing a firm specific input (McKenzie (1959), pp.66-67)
A8  X  n 5R'+ =  {0} .
Assumption A 8  puts no real restriction on production. It simply implies 
that goods which can be produced at no cost be ignored.
A9 Z ' n l / 0 .
A9 (with A2) implies that any consumer can survive without trade.
a i o  o e i n t z  n  x .
A10 implies that any price which supports X  will have pz < 0 for some 
z £ Z. This means that, if prices are compatible with equilibrium, then 
some consumer has positive income, in the sense that they are not on the 
boundary of their net trade set.
An allocation is a pair, (z1 ,x)  =  {z* €  Z'  : i 6  I, x k 6  X k : k € K }, of 
individuals’ net trades, and an output vector. An allocation is feasible if and 
only if Eig/z ' =  x.
Prices are p € 3?£ /{0 }.
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Definition 14 (competitive equilibrium (McKenzie (1981))A competitive equi­
librium is a collection (p", z, f , x ' )  such that:
(i) z "  6  Z ' and p* • z "  < 0, and ul(z")  >  u'(z') for any z' € Z ' such that 
p' ■ z1 <  0 , i =  1 ,
(ii) x * € X, p* • x* — 0, and p* • x' < 0 for any x' e X.
(iii) £ ie/z "  =  x*.
The definition of a quasi-equilibrium is as in definition 14, replacing (i) 
with (i') z "  e  Z ’ and p* • z*‘ < 0 , and u‘ (z*’ ) > u'(z') for any z' e  Z ’ such 
that p* • z' < 0 , or p* • z*’ < p* • z' for all z' 6  Z\ t =  1 , / .
At prices p 6  iR^/{0}, let Z ’ (p) =  {z ’ € Z ' H (—Z  +  X ) : pzl <  0} 
denote the set of affordable trades for individual i which satisfy the aggregate 
feasibility constraint. Z '(p) =  {z* € Z '(p) : z* Sargmax u '(z)}, denotes
z 'iZ H p )
those affordable feasible trades for individual i which give him the most 
utility. We then define, $ ’ (p) =  {z  6  Z ' : u‘ (z' +  z) > u'(z*),z' 6  Z*(p)} ¿is 
the set of net trades which when added to some utility maximizing affordable 
feasible trade at prices p, make individual i better off. Local non-satiation 
(a sufficient condition) implies that this set is non-empty.
Definition 15 (price graph) The price graph of the exchange economy E  at 
prices p, denoted T(E{jp)), is a collection of vertices V and arcs A such that
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each vertex vi corresponds to consumer i for  ¿ =  1 , 2 , ...I and an arc directed 
from Vi to Vj exists whenever i can make j  better off, in the sense that there 
is some /  C I 10,with i 6  7, j  E / / /  such that ( - Z '  +  X )  n  $^(p) /  0, 
and for any / '  C 7 suc/i i/iat i G there is some m 6  / / / '  suc/i i/iai
( -Z 7' + x) n $m(p) /  0.
According to the above definition, in a three individual economy with 
¿ =  1,2, 3, an arc V\V3 exists if either (a) 1 can single handedly make 3 better 
off, (b) 1 and 2 can make 3 better off and 1 can make 2 better off. The 
following example illustrates when arcs exist in a price graph and when they 
do not.
Example 16 Let I  =  {1 ,2 ,3 }, L =  {1 ,2 }, X  =  {0 } , ul{z) =  minfz} +  
1, z^+l} ,  u2 (z) =  min{2 i, 22+ 1 }, u3(2 ) =  m in{2 f + l ,  2 3}, Z l =  {z  : z\ >  —1, 
z\ >  —1}, Z 2 =  {z : z\ >  0, z2 >  —1}, Z 3 — {z  : zf  >  —1, z3 > 0}. At prices 
p =  (0,1), the arc set of the price graph r(E(p) )  is {viV2 ,ViV3 ,v2Vi,V2V3}. 
The arcs ViV2 and V\V3 exist because individual 1 can supply positive amounts 
of both commodities, and therefore make both individual 1  and individual 2  
better off, in the required sense, at any feasible affordable utility maximising 
net trade (or indeed at any feasible net trade). To see that the arc v2v3 exists, 
10 Here, without confusion, the symbol “C ” denotes strict inclusion.
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note that at these prices Z 3 (p) =  {(0, 0)}. Since (0 ,1) e  — Z 2 and u3(0,1) > 
n3(0,0), ( - Z 2 +  X )  PI $ 3(p) =  0, and the arc v2v3 exists. The arc v2Vi also 
exists because although ( - Z 2 +  X ) fl $ ! (p) =  0, (—Z^2,3) +  X )  D <i>l (p) ^  0 
and ( - Z 2 +  X )  n $ 3(p) /  0- The arcs v3Vi, i =  1,2, do not exist because 
( - X 3 +  X ) D $ i(p )= r0 .
Let C  denote the collection of price graphs of economy E at all prices, 
p £ 3i+ /{0}- Note that the set of price graphs of an economy does not depend 
on the normalization chosen. That is, all p such that 3q with p =  Xq for some 
A >  0 have the same price graph, F(E(p)).
We are now in a position to state the main definition of this section.
D efinition 17 (C-irreducibility) The economy is said to be C-irreducible if 
every member of the collection of price graphs C is strongly connected, that 
is, i fT{E{p))  is strongly connected at each p £ 5R^/{0}.
P roposition  18 If the economy E satisfies assumptions A1 — .410 above, 
and in addition is C-irreducible, then a competitive equilibrium exists.
P roof. Under assumptions A 1 — /llO 11, a quasi-equilibrium (p*, z ' 1 , x m) 
for the economy E  exists (see Debreu (1962), McKenzie(1981)), at which
11 Assumption (A6) is needed to ensure that at a quasi-equilibrium, prices are contained 
in R i / { 0 } .
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there is some individual i for whom 3z' G Z x such that p"z‘ <  0. Consider 
the partition of the set of vertices of r(£'(p,))) {V 1, V2}  such that V 1 =  {v* : 
3z’ G Z' p'z' < 0 } ,  and V 2 =  : $zl G Z'  s.t. p'z' <  0 } .  Note that, by
definition of a quasi-equilibrium, Vi/j G V 1, z "  G Z'(p"). We prove that V2 is 
empty. Suppose by contradiction that V 2 is non-empty. By assumption, the 
graph r (£ ’(p*)) is strongly connected and so, by lemma 5, there exists an arc 
from V 2 to V 1, and vice versa. In particular, there exists Vi G V 2 and Vj G V 1 
such that ViVj exists. Given the way arcs are defined, the existence of ViVj 
implies that (—Z 7+X)n<E>J(p*) ^  0, with i G / ,  j  £ /  and for any / '  C 7 such 
that i G 7 , there is some m G 7/7' such that {—Z r +  X )  fi $ m(p) /  0. Since 
individual j  is utility maximizing at z"1, it follows that there is an m0 G I  such 
that vmo G V 1. But then, there exists a sequence of individuals (mi, 
such that (—Z' +  X )  ft <I>m'f (p*) ^  0, and (—Z m* +  X )  D $ m‘ - ‘ (p*) 0.
Therefore, each vmil G V 1, the arcs vmhvmk_l , v,vmK, k =  1,..., K  exist, and 
thus Vi G V 1, a contradiction. ■
To illustrate the role of C-irreducibility in the proof of existence, con­
sider an economy with 4 individuals, I  =  {1 ,2 , 3 ,4}. Assumptions A1-A10 
guarantee the existence of a quasi-equilibrium (p, z 1 ,x )  at which at least one 
individual has positive income. To show that a quasi-equilibrium is a com­
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petitive equilibrium, we must show that if one individual has positive income 
then so do all the other individuals in the economy. Suppose that individual 
1 has positive income at p. We show that if the economy is irreducible then 
individual 2 also has positive income, and since individual 2 was chosen ar­
bitrarily then so do all others. C-irreducibility implies that at prices p there 
exists an arc in the graph T(E(p)) from V 2 =  {2 ,3 ,4 } to V 1 =  {1 }, which 
implies that either 2,3, or 4 has positive income. If it is individual 2, we are 
done. If not, then either 3 or 4 has positive income, and since C-irreducibility 
implies the existence of an arc from V2 =  {2 }  to V 1 =  {1 ,3 ,4 } in T{E(p)) 
then 2 can make either 3 or 4 better off. Assume without loss of generality 
that player 3 has positive income. Then if 2 can make 3 better off we are 
done. If not, then 2 can make 4 better off. However, C-irreducibility also 
implies the existence of an arc from V 2 =  {2 ,4 }  to V 1 =  {1 ,3 }  in r(E (p )). 
Therefore, either 2 and 4 can make 1 better off, or they can make 3 better 
off. Either scenario implies that either 2 or 4 has positive income. If it is 2 
we are done. If it is 4, then since 2 can make 4 better off we are done.
Note that since V  is finite, by assumption, C  contains a finite number of 
graphs. For some practical models, it may be possible to infer all the members 
of C, in which case each graph could be tested for C-irreducibility. That is,
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one could plot the graph and determine it’s connectedness by inspection. It 
is however sufficient for existence of a competitive equilibrium to work with 
a collection which contains a strongly connected subgraph of each member 
of C.
C orolla ry  19 If one can construct a set of strongly connected graphs C, 
such that each member of C has at least one member of C  as a spanning 
subgraph, then the economy E is C-irreducible.
2.3.2 C-irreducibility and irreducibility
In this section, we show that C-irreducibility and McKenzie’s (1961) irre­
ducibility are different conditions, that is, neither implies the other. We then 
expand the definition of an arc in the price graph to define an alternative 
condition, C'-irreducibility, a sufficient condition for existence o f competitive 
equilibria, which, we show, is weaker than McKenzie’s irreducibility.
Let (z 1  ,x )  be a feasible allocation and consider a trade z'which if added 
to individual i ’s allocation at z1 she is made better off i.e. u'(z' +  z') > u'(z'). 
Define <$*(z 1 ,x )  as the collection of all such trades. Weak monotonicity (a 
necessary condition) and local non-satiation (a sufficient condition) imply 
that this set is non-empty. We define an allocation graph for the exchange
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economy E  as follows.
Definition 20 (type 1 allocation graph) The type 1 allocation graph of econ­
omy E  at allocation (z 1 , x), denoted T1 (E(zJ ,x) ),  is a collection of arcs A and 
vertices V, where each vertex Vi corresponds to consumer i for i =  1 , 2 , . . . / ,  
and an arc directed from i/< to Vj exists whenever there is some ï  C I , with 
i £ / ,  j  £ / / /  such that ( - Z 1 +  X )  n ^ ( z 1, x ) ^  0, and for any / '  C /  such 
that i € / ' ,  there is some m £ / / / '  such that ( - Z 1' +  X )  fl i>m(2 / , x) /  0.
Let C 1 denote the collection of allocation graphs r 1( £ ( 2 / ,z ))  at all fea­
sible allocations.
McKenzie (1959, 1961) proposed the irreducibility condition as a way of 
overcoming the existence problem with boundary endowments. The formal 
definition of irreducibility is as follows.
Definition 21 (irreducibility (McKenzie (1961)): Let { I 1 ,12} be a non­
trivial partition of the set of individuals such that I 1 D I 2 =  0, 71 U I 2 =  
/ ,  z,k =  £ iç/kz', and Z ,k =  £ i6 /*Z*, for k — 1,2. Then the economy is 
irreducible if, however I 1 and I 2 may be selected, if z1' =  x — z 1* with x  6  X, 
z1' € Z 1' , and z l 2 £ then there is also x‘ € X , and w £ Z ,%, such that 
z'1' =  x ' — z/3 — w and u'(zn) > u'(z') for all i £  I 1, and u'(z'') >  u'(z') for
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som e i € I 1.
Under standard assumptions (A1 — /HO) a quasi-equilibrium exists. Ir­
reducibility is sufficient to guarantee that if one individual in the economy 
has positive income (true at a quasi-equilibrium) then so do all others, and 
quasi-equilibria are thus competitive equilibria. To see this, let (p, z1, x) be a 
quasi-equilibrium, and consider the partition {7 1, / 2}, where 71 is the set of 
consumers such that there is z' £ Z' with pz' <  0, and 72 =  7/I1. We now 
show that irreducibility implies that 72 is empty. Irreducibility implies that 
there is x 1 £ X, and w £ Z /2, such that z1,1 — x ‘ — z ' 2 —w and ul(zn) > u'(z') 
for all i £ 71, and u'(z,tl) > u’ (i*') for some ii £ 71. Since zHl is preferred 
to z“  and ¿i is utility maximising, then pz'" >  0, and so p  z'1' >  0. But 
p i1' — 0 since individuals in 71 are utility maximising, and px =  0 by defini­
tion at a quasi-equilibrium, which implies pz,/l =  0. Therefore, since px' < 0, 
pw <  0. But w £ Z ' 2, so some individual in 72 has positive income. This 
contradicts the definition of 72, therefore 72 is empty.
Lemma 2 2  The econom y E  is irreducible if  and only i f  ev ery  m em ber o f  C 1 
is strongly connected.
Proof. Assume the economy E  is irreducible. First notice that by setting
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/ 2 =  I 1 =  { / / ¿ } ,  at any feasible allocation (zl ,x)  there is some i' £ I 
such that (—Zl +  X )  D , x) /  0. Now consider a non-trivial partition of 
the set of individuals {7 1,72}. At any feasible allocation (z1, x), irreducibility 
implies that there exists j  G 71 such that (—Z /2 +  A ) fl & (z1, x) /  0. Next, 
we claim that there exists i £ 72 such that the arc ViVj exists in the associated 
allocation graph Tl(E ( z l , x)). That is, we claim that there is /  C I 2 with 
t £ / ,  such that (—Z 1  +  X)  PI & ( z ! , x)  y^  0, and for any 7' C 7 such that 
i £ / ',  there is some m  G / / / '  such that { —Z 1' + X)  fl $ m(z/ ,x ) 0. We
can construct such a subset I as follows. First, recall that there is some 
i' G I  such that (—Z 1 +  X)  D $ 1' (zl ,x)  0. If il G I 1, set I  — i, and
j  =  i'. If on the other hand i' G I 2, consider I\ =  By irreducibility,
either 3 j  € I 1 such that (—Z ' 1 +  X )  fl & ( z ' , x )  /  0, in which case set 
/  =  Ii, or 3i" G / 2/ / i  such that ( - Z ' 1 +  X )  PI ^'" (z^x)  y^  0, in which 
case consider /2 =  By irreducibility, either 3 j  G I 1 such that
( - Z ' 1 +  X )  fl & ( z r, x )  /  0, in which case set /  =  / 2, or 3i'" G / 2/ / 2 such 
that ( - Z *2 +  X )  fl (z1, x) y^  0, in which case consider I3 =  { i ,i ' ,i"
By repeating this process if necessary, we can find /„  such that 3 j  £ I 1 such 
that (—Z,n + X )C \ & ( z I ,x)  /  0 and set /  =  In. By construction, this subset 
satisfies the condition that for any / '  C /  such that t G / ' ,  there is some m G
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/ / / '  such that (—Z 1' +  X )  n ±  0. Therefore, the arc vtVj exists in
the associated allocation graph Tl(E(z 1 ,x)).  By irreducibility, this is true for 
any non-trivial partition of the set of individuals {7 1,72}, and for any feasible 
allocation (z1 ,x).  Therefore, by lemma 5, the allocation graph r l(E(zl ,x))  
is strongly connected, for all feasible allocations (z1 ,x). Conversely, assume 
that the allocation graph r l(E(zl ,x))  is strongly connected, for all feasible 
allocations (z1 ,x ). By lemma 2.4, at a feasible allocation (zr,x) ,  for every 
non-trivial vertex partitioning {7 1, 72}, we can find some i G I 2 and j  G 71, 
such that, 37 C 7, with i G 7 , such that (—Z'  4- X)  D & { z ' , x )  ^  0, and 
for any / '  C /  with i e  there is some m G I / / '  such that (—Z 1' +  
X)  D $ m(2 / ,x) 0. Therefore, there exists I  C I 2 and j  G I 1 such that
(—Z ' +  X )  fl ^ ( z 1 ,x)  0. But then, there exists w G Z ' 2 and x' G X  such
that P  =  2; — w +  x' and u2 (P )  > v?[z?). By assumption z1' =  x — z ,2  
with z/l G Z1' , z ,2  G Z ' 2 and x G X . Define z'2‘ =  z^'ij' G I l/j and 
z'2 =  P .  Then, z'1' =  x' — z ' 2 — w while, by construction, P' (z2') > u3'(z2') 
for all j '  G I 1, and u3 (z'3) > v?(z3) as required. As this construction works 
at any feasible allocation (zl , x ), and by assumption Tl (E(zI ,x))  is strongly 
connected at every fesisible allocation (z1  ,x) ,  the economy E  is irreducible.
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Comparison of C-irreducibility and the graph theoretic representation of 
irreducibility highlights that although the two conditions are closely related, 
neither implies the other. To see that irreducibility does not necessarily imply 
C-irreducibility, suppose the economy E is irreducible and consider the price 
graph of the economy at prices p 6  3?£ /{0 }. Consider a non-trivial partition 
of the set of individuals { I 1 ,12} with 71 =  {*}, I 2 =  I/{i} ,  and a feasible 
allocation (z ' ,x )  such that z' € Z'(p). Irreducibility implies that 3j  6  72 
such that j  €  / ,  i  6  7 / / ,  (—Z 1 +  X )  fl ^‘ (z1, x)  /  0, and for any 7' C 7 such 
that j  e 7, there is some m € 7 /7 ' such that (—Z'' +  X )  fl $ m(z/ ,x) 0,
and since <i>, (z, ,x ) C  by construction, an arc exists from I 2 to 71.
Now consider a feasible allocation (z,J ,x)  which implies an affordable utility 
maximising net trade for some j  € I 2. Irreducibility implies that 3k € I 2 
such that i e l , k €  I/f, {—Z 1 +  X ) Cl $*(2 7, x)  0, and for any / '  C  /  such 
that i e  / ,  there is some m 6  / / / '  such that {—Z'' +  X)  n $ m(zr,x)  ^  0. 
However, there is no guarantee that k =  j ,  and no guarantee therefore that 
an arc exist from 71 to 72, so that the price graph at p 6  5K+/{0} may fail to 
be strongly connected, in which case C-irreducibility fails.
To see that the reverse is not true either, that is, C-irreducibility does 
not necessarily imply irreducibility, consider the following example:
I r r e d u c i b i l i t y  i n  E x c h a n g e  E c o n o m i e s 52
Example 23 Let I — {1 ,2 ,3 }, L  =  {1 ,2 }, X  =  {0}, u^z) =  min{z} + 
1 , z  ^+  1}, u2(z) =  z\ +  l +  m in{azf, zf + 1 }, u3 (z) =  zj 4 -l+m in {z? +  l ,a z f } ,
0 <  a < 1/4, Z 1 =  {z  : z\ >  - 1 ,  z\ >  - 1 }, Z 2 =  {z : z\ >  0, zf > - 1 }, 
Z 3 =  {z  : z3 >  —1, z\ >  0}. Note that as individual 1 is endowed with 
positive amounts of both commodities, it follows that for all p G 5î+ /{0 } the 
arcs V1 V2 and V1 V3 exist in the associated price graph. Also note that since 
(1, 1) G -Z < 2'3>, { - Z ^  +  X ) n ^ ( p )  /  0, for all p G D?2 / { 0 } .  WhenPl =  0, 
p2 >  0, then Z 3 (j>) =  {(0, 0)}, and since (0,1) G — Z 2 and u3 (0,1) =  1 +  a >
1 =  u3(0, 0) the arc V2V3 exists. Although individual 2 alone cannot make 
individual 1  better off at these prices, (as ( - Z 2 4 - ^ ) 0  <1>1 (p) = 0 / ,  we have 
established that (—.Z^ 2'3) +  X )  D «^ (p ) ^  0 and ( - Z 2 +  X )  n  $ 3(p) ^  0, so 
that the arc v2V1 does in fact exist. Since Z 2 (jp) =  {(2 ,0 )}, (1,0) G — Z3, and 
u2 (3, 0) =  1 +  3a > 1 +  2a =  u3(2, 0 ), the arcs V3V2 and v3vi also exist, and 
the graph is therefore strongly connected. By a symmetric argument, when 
Pi >  0, p2 =  0, the graph is also strongly connected. It remains to check the 
arc set of the price graph when pi >  0, p2 > 0. Note first that individual 
rationality implies that azf <  z\ +  1. Individual rationality further implies 
that if a z 2 =  zf +  1 , then it must be that r 1 (z 1 ) =  2 (zf +  1) =  2azf >  1 =  
it*(0, 0), a contradiction since 0 <  a  <  1/4, and at any feasible allocation
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z'f <  2. It follows that at any feasible affordable utility maximising bundle 
az2 < z\ +  1, and therefore, since (1,0) € —Z 3, the arcs v3v2 and v3V\ exist. 
A similar argument establishes the existence of v2v3 and v2 v\, and the graph 
is therefore strongly connected. With reference to McKenzie’s definition of 
irreducibility, consider the partition I 1 =  {1 ,2 }, I 2 =  {3 }. At the feasible 
allocation (z1 ,x), with z 1 =  (0 , 0 ), z2 =  ( 1 , - 1), z3 =  ( - 1 , 1), 1  =  0 , neither 
individual 1 nor individual 2 can be made better off by any feasible trade from 
(—Z 3 +  X ), and thus the economy is not irreducible. However, a competitive 
equilibrium exists: p* =  ( 1 , 1), z" 1 =  (0 , 0 ), z*2 =  (0 , 0 ), z ‘ 3 =  (0 , 0 ).
Notice that what matters in this economy, other than the fact that indi­
viduals have Leontief preferences and boundary endowments, is the size of the 
preference parameter a relative to the aggregate endowment of commodities 
1 and 2. Utility maximising individuals with these Leontief preferences would 
always wish to consume the two goods in some fixed proportions. When this 
is the case, they can not be made better off by receiving more of a single 
good. At such net trades, individuals 2 and 3 would not be able to make 
each other better off. However, the relationship of aggregate endowments to 
the preference parameter a is such that it is never possible for both 2 and 3 
to consume the two goods in the desired proportions. C-irreducibility holds
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then, because whatever the price vector, and for all i and j ,  i can make j  
better off (in the sense of definition 15) at any net trade which is individually 
rational for j .  Irreducibility, on the other hand, fails because we are required 
to consider all feasible allocations.
By modifying the definition of an arc in the price graph, we can however 
derive an alternative condition, sufficient for existence, which is in fact weaker 
than irreducibility. We now define two types of arcs. The first type of arcs 
are just those used in the definition of C-irreducibility.
Definition 24 (Type 1 arcs) Consider a collection o f vertices V where each 
vertex V{ corresponds to consumer i for i =  1,2, ...I. At prices p a type 1 arc 
directed from Vi to Vj exists whenever there is some I  C I ,with i € I, j  € I/I 
such that ( - Z 1 +  X ) fl $ ; (p) ^  0, and for any / '  C /  such that i 6  / ' ,  there 
is some m € / / / '  such that ( - Z 1' +  X ) fl 4>m(p) ^  0. At prices p, denote the 
set of such arcs as A\(p).
The second type of arc exists under less restrictive conditions.
Definition 25 (Type 2 arcs) Consider a collection of vertices V where each 
vertex Vi corresponds to consumer i for i =  1,2,.../. At prices p a type 1 
arc directed from Vi to Vj exists whenever there is some k0 6  I , j  € I / /  such
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that ( - Z *  +  X )  PI $J(p) /  0, and fo r  any V  C /  such that k0 e  /', there 
is som e m e  / / / '  such that ( - Z ' '  +  X )  n $ m(p) ^  0, and in addition, fo r  
any feasible allocation (z 1 ,x )  such that e Z1 (p) , there is som e sequence o f  
individuals (k\, k2 l kn ), such that (a) i € I , k s  £ / / /  with { —Z l +  X )  n 
<PkN(z I , x )  ^  0 and fo r  any / '  C /  such that i € i/iere is some m € / / / '  
suc/i iAai ( - Z 7' +  X )  D $ m(z l , x ) ,  and (b) \/kn, kn e ï ,  kn_ x € I/ Ï  with 
( - Z '  +  X )  (~l 0 and /or any / ' C /  suc/i that kn e i/iere ts
som e m  e  I /1' such that ( —Z I' +  X ) n ^ m(z, , x ) .  A t  prices p, d enote the set 
o f such arcs as A 2(p).
Consider a 3 individual economy, with i =  1,2,3-. For a type 1 arc to exists 
from Vi to V3 (at prices p), either individual 1 alone can make 3 better off at 
any feasible affordable utility maximising net trade, or else 1 and 2 can make 
3 better off at any feasible affordable utility maximising net trade, and 1 can 
make 2 better off at any feasible affordable utility maximising net trade. The 
existence of a type 2 arc from 1 to 3 (at prices p) requires that individual 2 
can make 3 better off at any feasible affordable utility maximising net trade, 
and that 1 can make 2 better off at any allocation which implies a feasible 
affordable utility maximising net trade for individual 3.
Definition 26 (m odified price graph) The modified p r ice  graph o f  the ex-
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change economy E at prices p, denoted T'(E(p)), is a collection of vertices V 
and arcs A  such that each vertex Vi corresponds to consumer i for i =  1 ,2 ,.../ 
and A =  Ai(p)  U A2 {p).
D efin ition  27 (C 1 -irreducibility) The economy is said to be C'-irreducible if 
T'(E(p)) is strongly connected at each p € 5R^/{0}.
For ease of exposition, let .4i(p) arcs be called direct arcs, and A?{p) arcs 
be called indirect arcs.
P roposition  28 If the economy E satisfies assumptions A1 — .410 above, 
and in addition is C'-iireducible, then a competitive equilibrium exists.
P roof. Under assumptions >11 — .410, a quasi-equilibrium (p*, z ’ 1 , x*) for 
the economy E  exists (see Debreu(1962), McKenzie(1981)), at which there 
is some individual i for whom 3z’ 6  Zx such that p'z* < 0. Consider the 
partition of the set of vertices of T(E(pm)), { V l, V 2}  such that V 1 =  {u< : 
3zl 6  Zx p*zx < 0}, and V 2 =  {vi : jSzx 6  Zx s.t. p 'zx <  0}. Note that, by 
definition o f a quasi-equilibrium, Vvj € V 1, z "  6  Zx(p’ ).We prove that V 2 
is empty. Suppose by contradiction that V 2 is non-empty. By assumption 
the graph r(£ '(p*)) is strongly connected and so, by lemma 5, there exists 
an arc from V 2 to V 1, and vice versa. In particular, there exists i\ € V 2 and
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vj G V 1 such that v,v3 exists. Given the definition of C ’-irreducibility, ViVj 
may be a direct or an indirect arc. If V{Vj is a direct arc, this implies that 
(—Z l +  X )  fl &(p")  #  0, with i e  I, j  i  I  and for any / '  C /  such that 
i G /', there is some m G ///' such that ( — Z 1' +  X )  n  $ m(p) 0. Since
individual j  is utility maximizing at z ' 1 , it follows that there is an m0 G /  such 
that vmo G V 1. But then, there exists a sequence of individuals (m i,...,m ( ) 
such that (—Zx +  X ) PI #  0, and ( — +  X)  Pi $ m*-‘ (p*) ^  0.
Therefore, each vmi G V 1, the arcs vmkvmk_l , vivrnK, k =  1 exist, and 
thus Vi G V 1, a contradiction. If v,Vj is an indirect arc, then there exist 
V i , v ko G V 2 and v3 G V 1 such that (—Z' +  X )  PI ^ (p * ) ^  0, with ko G /, 
j  £ I and for any / '  C  /  such that k0 G / ' ,  there is some m G / / / '  such 
that (—Z ' ‘ +  X )  PI $ m(p) 0 (so that by the previous argument vko G V 1),
and for any feasible allocation (z1, x) such that G Z] (p), there is some 
sequence of individuals (ki,k2, ...,k\), such that ( - Z '  +  X ) C\$kN(z1, x )  #  0
and (—Z kn + X )  PI $ kn~l(zI,x)  ^  0, so that each vkn G V ,  n =  1.....TV, and
thus Vj G K1, a contradiction. ■
Notice then that C-irreducibility implies C'-irreducibility, but the reverse 
is not necessarily true. We now show that C'-irreducibility is weaker than
McKenzie’s irreducibility.
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Proposition  29 Irreducibility implies C'-irreducibility.
P roo f. Suppose the economy is irreducible. Consider prices p e  9 i+ /{0}, 
and a non-trivial partition of the set of vertices { V l , V2}. Consider the fea­
sible allocation (z‘ , x ) which implies an affordable utility maximising net 
trade for individual j ,  where Vj G V2. Since p, { V l, V 2}, and j  were cho­
sen arbitrarily, to establish that the economy is C"-irreducible, it is suf­
ficient to show that there is some Vj G V 1 such that the arc ViVj exists 
in the modified price graph T'(E(p)). By irreducibility, either there exists 
Vi G V 1 such that ( —Z l 4- X )  fl ^ ( z 1 ,x)  /  0, with i €  / ,  j  € / / /  
and for any / '  C  I  such that i € / ',  there is some m € / / / '  such that 
(—Z r +  X )  D <1•m(z, ,x)  / 0 , - i n  which case the arc ViVj exists and we are 
done - or there exists u*0 € V 2 such that (—Z 1 +  X )  D & { z * , x)  ^  0, with 
kg G / ,  j  € / / /  and for any / '  C  I such that i G there is some m G I /1' 
such that (—Z 1' +  X )  fl 3'm{z'  ,x )  ^  0, in which case the arc v/^ Vj exists 
in the modified price graph r '(E(p)). Now, irreducibility implies that either 
there exists t\ G V 1 such that (—Z' +  X)  fl <i‘*°(z/ ,x ) ^  0, with i G / ,  
j  £ I and for any / '  C  /  such that i G there is some m G / / / '  such that 
(—Z r +X )r\ $m(zI ,x )  /  0, - in which case the arc v^ Vj exists and we are done 
- or there exists t/*, G V 2 such that (— + X )  D i>*°(2 / , x) /  0, with k\ G / ,
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ko £ /  and for any / '  C 7 such that k\ G / ' ,  there is some m G / / / '  such that 
(—Z r + X ) n $ m(z/ ,x )  7^  0, in which case the arc exists in the modified 
price graph r '(£ ’(p)). If we repeat this process, we end up with a sequence 
of individuals {k0,ki, k2, ..., kN), with kn G 71, n =  0 , 1 , iV, such that Vfcn,
€ /,& „_ i G / / /w i t h  (—Z '+ Z )n < I >*n- 1 (z7, x) yf 0 and for any / '  C /such  
that A;„ G / ',  there is some m  G / / / '  such that {—Z''  +  X )  fl $ m(z/ ,x ). In 
addition, we have k0 G 7, j  G / / /  and for any / '  C /  such that i G / ' ,  there is 
some m G / / / '  such that ( -Z ' '  +  X)r\<bm(z ' , x ) y^  0. Consider the partition 
{ / 2l, / 22} of / 2, where / 2l =  {fc0, &i, fc2, £ at} and 722 =  72/ / 2*. By con­
struction, no arcs exist from / 2l to 722 in the allocation graph r 1(£(z/, x)). 
By irreducibility, an arc must exist from 71 fl 722 to 72‘ . It follows therefore 
that there exists vt G V 1 such that (—Z 1 +  X )  O $*n(z /,x )  ^  0, with i G 7, 
/cn G 7 / /  and for any 7' C 7 such that i G 7', there is some m G / / / '  such 
that (—Z r +  X )  f"l$m(z / ,x ) 0, for some A;n in the sequence, and therefore
the arc ViVj exists. ■
Given that C-irreducibility implies C'-irreducibility, example 23 also serves 
to illustrate that C'-irreducibility does not imply irreducibility. We can there­
fore conclude that C'-irreducibility is a weaker sufficient condition for the ex­
istence of competitive equilibria than is irreducibility. Intuitively, the sense
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in which C'-irreducibility is weaker is that whereas irreducibility requires 
a particular relationship to hold between every pair of individuals at every 
feasible allocation, C'-irreducibility only requires a relationship to hold be­
tween any pair of individuals for some subset of feasible allocations, which 
contains the set of quasi-equilibrium allocations. While McKenzie’s defi­
nition needs to be checked at each of a continuum of feasible allocations, 
C'-irreducibility needs to be checked at a continuum of possible prices (the 
dual of the commodity space). However, as corollary 19 makes clear, the 
added advantage of a graph theoretic representation is that C'-irreducibility 
need only be checked for a finite set of graphs. For small models, these 
graphs may be inferred and strong connectedness determined by inspection. 
For large, more complex models, this procedure is obviously problematic. 
However, even with such large models, C'-irreducibility lends itself to testa­
bility, where irreducibility does not. The adjacency matrix of an economy 
graph can easily be constructed using the relevant index sets of the economy. 
There are then well-known efficient computational algorithms which can be 
used to test for the irreducibility of the matrix (see for example Aho et al. 
(1983)). Also, C'-irreducibility works with quasi-concave utility functions, 
an added advantage over McKenzie (1959, 1981).
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2.3.3 Irreducibility and resource relatedness
In this section we study the relationship between McKenzie’s (1961) irre­
ducibility and Arrow and Hahn’s (1971) resource relatedness. It is well known 
that resource relatedness implies irreducibility (see McKenzie (1981)). The 
reverse relationship is however far from obvious, and remains an open ques­
tion in the literature. However, by translating these two conditions into 
restrictions on appropriately defined economy graphs, we are able to high­
light the relationship between the two, and in particular provide conditions 
under which the two conditions are equivalent.
Denote by Zx__ C Zx the set of all feasible trades of individual i which 
are non-positive in all components, and strictly negative in some, Zx_ — 
{z x e  Z x : zx < 0, z\ 0 for some l € L}. This set is non-empty by 
assumption. We now define a second type of allocation graph for the exchange 
economy E. This graph has an identical vertex set to the type 1 allocation 
graph, but differs in the way arcs are defined.
D efin ition  30 (type 2 allocation graph) The type 2 allocation graph of econ­
omy E at allocation (z1 ,x ), denoted T2(E (z/, x )), is a collection of arcs A and 
vertices V, where each vertex Vi corresponds to consumer i for i =  1 ,2 ,.../, 
and an arc directed from V{ to Vj exists whenever —Zx_ +  X  fl ^ ( z 1, x) ^  0.
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Let C 2 denote the collection of allocation graphs r2(E(z' ,x ) )  at all fea­
sible allocations (z ' ,x ) € F.
Arrow and Hahn (1971) define a relationship between two individuals 
known as resource relatedness.
Definition 31 (resource relatedness (Arrow and Hahn (1971)): Individual 
i is said to be resource related to individual j  if, for every feasible allocation, 
(z1 ,x ), there exists an allocation ( z "  ,x') and a vector w < 0, w ^  0 such 
that,
(i) Hieiz'' < x1 — w
(ii) Ej6/z'* 6 Z +  w
(in) u‘ (z'‘ ) > u'(z') Vi £ I
(iv) u3(z,]) > u'{z3) j  € I
(v) wi < 0 <=> zj < 0
That is, (z11 ,x ') would be a feasible allocation if the aggregate domain of 
trade were extended by w (where w is an increase only in those commodities 
of which individual i can supply positive amounts), all individuals are at 
least as well off under allocation (z'1 ,x ')  as under (z1 ,x ), and individual j  is
made strictly better off.
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We now show that if individual i is resource related to j ,  and j  has posi­
tive income at quasi-equilibrium prices p, then i also has positive income at 
p. Resource relatedness implies that we can find a vector w and an alloca­
tion (z'r, x') satisfying (i)-(v) with (z7,x) replaced with the quasi-equilibrium 
allocation (z7,x). Since z* minimises pz* subject to u'(z') >  u'(z') for any 
z! € Z l, it follows from (iii) that pz" > pi* for all i e / .  Since pz3 <  0, it 
follows that z3 maximises u3(z3) subject to pz3 <  pz3. Therefore, pz'3 > pz3, 
and p ^ i  e / 2'’ > P E i6/ 2‘ - Profit maximisation implies that pxk >  pxlk, 
for all k € K , thus pYlkeK x'k — PJ2keKxk- A-t by definition,
E ie /2’ =  E te x ^ * ’ so P E <6/ 2'* ~ p E k k  x 'k >  0 °  the other hand, it
follows from (i) that p 6/ z" V YLkzK x 'k < — pw, so that pw <  0. Since 
p > 0, this means that for some l, pi >  0 and Wi <  0, which by (v) implies 
that zj <  0 and so pz' <  0.
Individual i is said to be indirectly resource related to individual j  if there 
is a sequence of individuals, in, (n =  0 , 1 , N), with i0 =  t, i s  =  j ,  and in 
resource related to in+1. The economy is said to be resource related if every 
individual is indirectly resource related to every other. If the economy E  
satisfies assumptions A1 — >110 and in addition is resource related, then a 
competitive equilibrium exists. That is, resource relatedness is sufficient to
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guarantee that if one individual in the economy has positive income then so 
do all the others. To see this, let (p, zl ,x )  be a quasi-equilibrium at which 
individual j  has positive income. It is enough to show that if i is indirectly 
resource related to j ,  and j  has positive income, then i also has positive 
income. By definition, i/v_i is resource related to i/v =  j , and so by the 
above argument ¿w-i has positive income. Repeating this argument we have 
i/v- 2 with positive income, and so on and so forth, so that finally i0 =  i, has 
positive income.
Let us now restate the Arrow-Hahn condition in terms of partitions of the 
set of individuals. Consider a non-trivial partition of the set of individuals 
{ /* , I 2}, such that I 1 n / 2 =  0, I 1 U I2 =  I. We say that 71 is resource related 
to 12 if there exists i 6 I 1 and j  6 I2 such that i is resource related to j . 
We say that the economy is resource related if for any non-trivial partition 
of the set of individuals, 11 is resource related to I 2.
Lem m a 32 Every individual is indirectly resource related to every other if 
and only if every member of C 2 has an identical strongly connected spanning 
subgraph.
Proof. If there exists an arc directed from Vi to Vj in V2(E (z ', x)), 
—Z'_ +  X  <1 z1 ,x )  ^  0 at the feasible allocation (z1 ,x ). If there is an arc
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directed from Vi to Vj in T2(E (zI ,x ))  for all feasible (zl , x ) then — Z'_ +  X n  
& (z J,x )  /  0 for all feasible (z1 ,x ). Setting zH' =  z*' for all i' € / / { j } and 
z'i — z> +  w, w £ — Z'_, individual i is then resource related to individual j. 
If i is resource related to j ,  —Z'_ +  X f l & (z l , x )  /  0 for all (z7, x); therefore 
the arc ViVj exists in T2(E (zI,x ))  for all (z1, x). It follows that individual 
i is indirectly resource related to individual j  if and only if there exists the 
same path directed from v, to Vj in every allocation graph, r 2(£ (z 7, x)), and 
every individual is therefore indirectly resource related to every other if and 
only if the allocation graph r 2(£ '(z, ,x )) is strongly connected and identical 
for all feasible allocations (z ' ,x )  6 F. m
Lem m a 33 The economy is resource related if and only if every member of 
C2 has an identical strongly connected spanning subgraph.
Proof. By lemma 5, the allocation graph r 2(£^(z/ ,x ))  is strongly con­
nected if and only if for any non-trivial partitioning of the vertex set {K 1, V2} 
there exists at least one arc directed from V 1 to V 2 and at least one arc di­
rected from V 2 to V 1. In the allocation graph T2(E (z I,x ))  an arc exists from 
V 1 to V 2 if there exists i € 71 and j  e  72 such that —Zx_ + X  n$-7 (z/ ,x ) /  0, 
at the feasible allocation (z1 ,x ). By definition, therefore, the economy is
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resource related if and only if the allocation graph T2(E (zI ,x ))  is strongly 
connected and identical for all feasible allocations (z1 ,x). ■
C oro lla ry  34 The economy is resource related if and only if every individual 
is indirectly resource related to every other.
It is well known (see McKenzie (1981)) that resource relatedness implies 
irreducibility. Indeed, it is evident that if an arc ViVj exists in the graph 
T2(E (zr , x)), then ViVj also exists in the graph Tl(E (z1, x)). Comparison of 
the type 1 and 2 allocation graphs also highlights however that the reverse 
is not necessarily true. Nevertheless, the next proposition provides a set of 
sufficient conditions under which irreducibility and resource relatedness are 
equivalent. Let 1; =  (0,..., 1, ...,0) be an L dimensional vector with 1 in the 
Ith coordinate and zero elsewhere.
P rop osition  35 If utility functions are weakly monotone, and in addition 
satisfy u '(z  +  li) > u '(z) at some z € Zl => u’ (z' +  lf) >  u'(z') for all z’ 6 Zl, 
then irreducibility and resource related are equivalent.
Proof. It follows from the definition of an arc in each of the two types 
of allocation graph, that if an arc exists between two vertices in T2(E (z I, x)) 
then an arc exists between these vertices in T1(E (z , l x )), for any feasible
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allocation (z1 ,x ). Strong connectedness of the allocation graph F2(E (zI ,x )) 
therefore implies strong connectedness of the allocation graph F1(E (zI ,x ) ) t 
and hence, resource relatedness implies irreducibility. To see that when pref­
erences are weakly monotone and for each t €. I, if u 'fz +  l ;)  > u'(z) at some 
z e  Z' then u'(z' + 1;) > u'(z') for all z' € Zx, the reverse is also true, suppose 
that the economy is irreducible. Then, at any feasible allocation, (zJ, x), and 
for any partition of the set of individuals, {7 1, / 2}, there is some net trade, 
« 6 — Zl , with /  Ç I2, and some x' € X  such that (z +  x ‘ ) e  & (z ',x ) ,  
where j  € I 1. With weak monotonicity if (z +  x') € & (z r, x), then there 
exists some z' € — Z i  such that (z' 4- x') e  ^ ( z ^ x ) .  But then there is 
some l such that z[ > 0 and u’ (z +  1/) > u'(z) for all z e Z'. This further 
implies that there is some i 6 I , with z$ <  0 and therefore some 2" 6 —Z', 
and x ‘ g X  such that (z +  x1) 6 z / ,x ), at any feasible allocation (z ' ,x ),
that is j  is resource related to i, and therefore I2 is resource related to I 1. 
Since irreducibility implies that this is true for every partition of the set of 
individuals, the economy is therefore resource related. ■
Note that the two conditions are not equivalent in economies with Leontief 
preferences since the condition that ux(z +  1/) > u '(z) at some z e  Zx => 
ux(z' -f 1() > u'(z') for all z' € Zx is violated. We conclude that under
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standard assumptions, C'-irreducibility is weaker than irreducibility, which 
is weaker than resource relatedness.
2.4 Conclusion
The graph theoretic representation has allowed us to develop a weaker sur­
vival condition than any proposed in the existing literature to guarantee 
(that quasi-equilibria are competitive equilibria and therefore) the existence 
of competitive equilibria in finite production economies with boundary en­
dowments. Whereas irreducibility requires a particular relationship to hold 
between every pair of individuals at every feasible allocation, C'-irreducibility 
only requires a relationship to hold between any pair of individuals for some 
subset of feasible allocations, which contains the set o f quasi-equilibrium 
allocations. While McKenzie’s definition needs to be checked at each of a 
continuum of feasible allocations, C'-irreducibility need only be checked for a 
finite set of graphs. An added advantage of C'-irreducibility over irreducibil­
ity is that it works with quasi-concave utility functions.
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3 Finite Pure Exchange Economies with Incomplete 
Markets
3.1 Introduction
In economies with complete markets, C-irreducibility is trivially satisfied if 
preferences are strictly monotone. However, this is no longer true with in­
complete asset markets, since the incompleteness o f the market may limit 
the possibility of agents attaining some feasible trades. In this chapter, we 
extend the analysis of C-irreducibility to pure exchange economies with in­
complete asset markets. Additional restrictions with respect to the complete 
market case are required. These are joint restrictions on the asset structure 
and the distribution of endowments and the preferences of individuals. By 
modifying the definition of C-irreducibility to allow for the attainability of 
trades given the asset market structure, we obtain an analogous condition, 
C-irreducibility, which guarantees existence for economies with incomplete 
markets.
Gottardi and Hens (1996) propose an extension of McKenzie’s irreducibil­
ity condition - which they refer to as resource relatedness - to prove the exis­
tence of competitive equilibria in exchange economies with incomplete mar­
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kets and boundary endowments. With a complete set of markets, Gottardi 
and Hens’ and McKenzie’s conditions are in fact equivalent. We characterise 
Gottardi and Hens’ condition in terms of restrictions on graphs, to illustrate 
the relationship with C'-irreducibility. We show, with the aid of an example, 
that neither condition implies the other. However, a modification in the def­
inition of the arc set of a price graph determines an alternative condition, 
C'-irreducibility, which is sufficient for existence of competitive equilibria for 
a larger class of economies than Gottardi and Hens’ irreducibility.
The layout of the chapter is as follows. In section 3.2.1 we develop our 
C'-irreducibility condition, and use it to prove the existence of competitive 
equilibria in economies with incomplete asset markets and boundary endow­
ments. In section 3.2.2 we highlight the relationship between C'-irreducibility 
and the irreducibility condition proposed by Gottardi and Hens, and present 
the weaker condition of C'-irreducibility. We show that irreducibility im­
plies C'-irreducibility, and demonstrate by an example that the reverse is 
not necessarily true. In section 3.2.3, using a graph theoretic characterisa­
tion, we offer a sufficient condition for an exchange economy with incomplete 
asset markets to be effectively complete. Finally, in section 3.2.4 we briefly 
conclude the results of the chapter.
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3.2 Asset markets and graphs
3.2.1 C-irreducibility and competitive equilibria
In this section, we study exchange economies with incomplete asset markets. 
As in the previous chapter, there is a set I  of individuals who consume 
and trade commodities in the set L. However, in this chapter we ignore 
production due to the conceptual difficulty that with incomplete markets 
it is no longer obvious what the objective function of the firm should be. 
Traditionally it is assumed that a firm’s objective is to maximise profits. 
The foundation for profit maximisation is the Fisher separation theorem (see 
Milne, (1974)). If markets are complete, then the Fisher separation theorem 
implies that shareholders will be unanimous with respect to the optimal 
production plan for the firm, and the assumption of profit maximisation is 
therefore justified. However, if asset markets are incomplete, then generically 
there is disagreement amongst shareholders. The assumption that owners 
will wish to maximise profits is no longer appropriate. It is not clear however 
what the alternative should be. This question is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
There is a set, 5, of states o f nature with S =  {1 ,. . . ,S } ,  a finite non-
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empty set. There are two periods t =  0,1. In t — 1 some state s £ S 
of the world is realized. Let la denote commodity l in state s. In state s, 
commodity l s is the designated numeraire commodity. At t =  0, individuals 
trade in real assets, denoted by j  =  1,..., J. Asset j  pays R{ units of the 
numeraire commodity in state s. R £ 3i5x-'denotes the asset returns matrix. 
Assets are in zero net supply and there is no consumption in period t — 0. 
We assume that the asset returns matrix R has full column rank i.e. there are 
no redundant assets. A trade in assets, an asset portfolio for an individual 
i £ I  , is yl =  {y\ ,...,y j) € K7. At t =  1, individuals trade in spot markets 
for all commodities in L in each state s £ S. A net trade in commodities for 
an individual i £ I  is z' £ 5RiS , describing his net trade for each commodity 
in each state of nature. The set of feasible commodity net trades for i is 
Z' C 5Rt s . Each individual evaluates a net trade z £ Z' according to his 
utility function u' where id : Z' —> 5R.
We assume that id, Zx and Z  satisfy assumptions A 1 — A5 of section 
2.3.1. In addition, we assume strong monotonicity of individual preferences. 
Although this assumption could be relaxed, our motivations for maintain­
ing the strong monotonicity of preferences are to focus on the implications 
of incompleteness for C-irreducibility, and for comparability with the exist­
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ing literature. We show that even with strongly monotone preferences our 
condition is weaker than that proposed by Gottardi and Hens (1996).
B6 Vi € / ,  Vz, z' G z' > z =*• u\z') > u‘ (z).
An allocation of net trades is z1 =  (z1, ..., z1) where z' G Z' for each i £ / .  
A feasible allocation of net trades z1 satisfies in addition the condition that 
£  ieiz{ =  0.
Let q denote the set of asset prices and let ps G 3?++ denote spot prices 
in each state s € S. Given prices q,p3, s =  1,..., S each individual solves the 
following maximization problem:
Maifj,,*} u'{z) s.t. qy <  0, p,z, <  p3iR,y, s =  1 (B )
A competitive equilibrium is a collection {q*,pm,y ’ , z*1) such that:
(i) Given (y " ,z *’ ) solves (5 ) for each i G / ;
(ii) £¿6/ 2/*’ =  0, and £ ¿e/z "  =  0.
It is well known (see for instance Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)) 
that the maximization problem (B ) has a solution if and only if there are no 
arbitrage opportunities i.e. if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
B7 (N AC) $y G Sì'7 s.t. qy < 0 but Ry > 0.
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It is also well known (see for instance Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 
(1986)) that (N A C ) is equivalent to requiring that asset prices lie in the 
interior of the convex cone spanned by the rows of R. In other words we 
require that asset prices lie in the set Q =  {<7 G 5R7 : q =  RT9, fo r  some 9 G
K +b
In order to rule out satiation in asset demand, we need the following 
assumption.
B8 By 6 SR7 such that Ry > 0.
With this additional assumption, Q is a proper subset of 5R7 and therefore 
the boundary of Q, denoted by Q , is non-empty. In addition, with this 
assumption, 0 ^ Q. This implies that we can normalize both asset prices 
and spot commodity prices to lie on the unit sphere. For any k , let Sk =  
{x  6 S *  : ||*|| =  1}.
In order to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium we also need 
to assume, as in Gottardi and Hens (1996), that for at least one individual 
i € I, the set of date 0 admissible trades has a non-empty interior.
B9 'iq G Q nSJ, Vp, G 3î£+n S £', s =  1,..., S, Bi G /  such that Int(Bo{p , q, R) =  
{y  G : qy <  0,p £  +p,\R sy > 0, s -  1, . . . ,S } )  /  0.
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Let fl(p.i) be the 5 x 5  diagonal matrix formed out of the price of good 
1 in the various states. Then, (fi(p.i)R) is the linear space generated by the 
column vectors of the matrix Q(p,1)R.
A net trade for individual i, z‘ € Z', is attainable if for all p, e 5f£+ n 
SLys =  1 ,...,5 , [(pj2, ) ,s  =  1, ..,5] € (fi(p.i)/?). Let Z\ denote the set of 
attainable trades of individual i. An allocation z ‘  is attainable if z‘ 6 Z\ 
for all i £ I. Let A =  { z 1 : Eie/z ‘ =  0, z' 6 Z\, Vi € I } denote the 
set of all feasible attainable allocations. Z'A(p,q) =  {z l e Z lA : 3y 6 SR7 
such that qy <  0, p3z„ <  ps\Rsy, s =  1 ,...,5 } n A, then denotes the set 
of feasible attainable trades of individual i which are affordable at prices 
(p, q), and Z'A(jp,q) =  {z' € ZA(p,q) : z' eargmax u‘ ( i ) } ,  denotes those 
affordable feasible attainable trades for individual i which give him/her the 
most utility. We then define, $ '(p, q) =  {z  e Z  : u'(zl +  z) >  V i’ 6
Z'A(p ,q )} as the set of trades which when added to any utility maximizing 
affordable feasible attainable trade at prices (p, q), make individual i better 
off. Strong monotonicity (a sufficient condition) and local non-satiation (a 
sufficient condition) imply that this set is non-empty.
D efinition 36 (price graph) The price graph of the exchange economy E 
with asset returns matrix R at prices (p, q), denoted r(E (p , q), R), is a collec­
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tion of vertices V  and arcs A such that each vertex V{ corresponds to consumer 
i for i =  1,2 , I  and an arc directed from Vi to Vj exists whenever there is 
some I C I ,with i € / ,  j  € I/I such that —Z'A n & (p,q) ^  0, and for any 
V  C  /  such that i € / ' ,  there is some m 6 / / / '  such i/iai — n $ m(p, q) ^  0 .
Let C  denote the collection price graphs of economy E, at all prices (p , q), 
Pi 6 3?++ D 5 L, s =  1,..., S, q e Q fl SJ.
Definition 37 (C-irreducibility) The economy E with asset returns matrix 
R is C-irreducible if each member of C  is strongly connected.
Proposition 38 If the economy E with incomplete markets satisfies assump­
tions A1 — A5 and B6 — B 9, and in addition is C-irreducible, then a com­
petitive equilibrium exists.
Proof. Under assumptions A1 — A5 and B 6 — B 8  a quasi-equilibrium 
(p, q, z1, y),exists with p >  0, (Gottardi and Hens (1996)). From B 9 it fol­
lows that at prices (p, q) there is some i for whom IntB0(p,q, R) ±  0 and 
therefore cost minimization implies utility maximization. Consider the par­
tition of the set of vertices of T(E(p,q), R), { V l,V 2} such that V 1 =  {u* : 
IntB0(p,q, R) #  0}, and V 2 =  {vt : IntB0(p,q, R) =  0}. We prove that V2 
is empty. Suppose by contradiction that V 2 is non-empty. By assumption
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the graph T(E(p, q), R) is strongly connected and so, by lemma 5, there ex­
ists an arc from V 1 to V 2, and an arc from V2 to V 1. It follows from the 
definition of C-irreducibility that there exists vx g V 2 and Vj g V 1 such that 
— q) /  0, with i g / ,  j  £ /  and for any / '  C /  such that i g / ' ,  there 
is some m g / / / '  such that — H i >m(p, q) /  0. Since individual j  is utility 
maximizing at z1, it follows that there is an m0 6 I  such that vmo g V 1. 
But then, there exists a sequence of individuals (m i,...,m /c) such that each 
Vmk 6 V^and the arcs vmk_lvmk, vmkVi, k =  l , . . . ,K  exist. Therefore vx g V 1, 
a contradiction. ■
3.2.2 C-irreducibility and irreducibility
In this section we establish the relationship between C-irreducibility and Got- 
tardi and Hens’ (1996) irreducibility condition for economies with incomplete 
asset markets. We show that C-irreducibility is a different condition than ir­
reducibility, that is, neither implies the other. Subsequently, we define an 
alternative condition, C'-irreducibility - sufficient for existence - which we 
show to be weaker than Gottardi and Hens’ (1996) irreducibility.
Let z1 g A  be a feasible allocation and consider a net trade z' which 
if added to individual Vs allocation at z1 he/she is made better off i.e.
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ul(z' +  z ') > u'(z'). Define <b'A{z ')  as the collection of all such trades. Weak 
monotonicity (a necessary condition) and local non-satiation (a sufficient 
condition) imply that this set is non-empty.
Definition 39 (allocation graph) The allocation graph of economy E with 
asset returns matrix R  at allocation zl , denoted T(E (z l ),R ), is a collection 
of arcs A and vertices V, where each vertex Vj corresponds to consumer i for  
i =  1 , 2 , . . . / ,  and an arc directed from v, to v3 exists whenever there is some 
7 C I,with i 6 / ,  j  6  7 /7 such that —Z'A fl &A(zl ) ^  0, and for any V C /  
such that i e I', there is some m 6 I f  I' such that —ZA n (z1) /  0.
Let C 3 denote the collection of allocation graphs T(E (z'), R) for all fea­
sible attainable allocations z' 6 A.
D efinition 40 (irreducibility with incomplete asset markets (Gottardi and 
Hens (1996))12)  Let { 7 1, 12} be a non-trivial partition of the set of individuals 
such that I 1 PI 72 =  0, 71 U 72 =  7. z 'k =  Eie/*2‘ , and ZA =  T.iiIkZA, for  
k =  1,2. Then the economy is irreducible if, however 71 and 12 may be 
selected, if z '1 — — z /2 with z1' € ZA , and z '2 e ZA , then there is also
12Definition 40 is identical to Gottardi and Hens’ (1996) assumption A5 which they 
refer to as resource relatedness. We express it differently here to highlight the relationship 
to McKenzie’s (1961) definition of irreducibility.
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w £ Z'a , such that z " ' — —z1* — w, and u'(z'1) > u'(z’ ) for all i € I 1, and 
u'(z'i) >  u'(z') for some i g I 1.
Gottardi and Hens’ definition of irreducibility generalizes McKenzie’s def­
inition of irreducibility to the case with incomplete asset markets. Note that 
when asset markets are complete - when the asset returns matrix R has full 
rank - Z' =  Z\ for each i g 7 and the two definitions coincide.
Lem m a 41 The economy E with asset returns matrix R is irreducible if and 
only if every member of C 3 is strongly connected.
Proof. Suppose the economy E  with asset returns matrix R is irre­
ducible. First notice that by setting 12 =  {¿}, 11 =  {I/ i}, at any feasible 
attainable allocation z 1 there is some i'^ ,^  g 7 such that — Z\ D ^ ( z 1) /  0. 
Now consider a non-trivial partition of the set of individuals {7 1, 72}. At any 
feasible attainable allocation z1, irreducibility implies that there exists j  g 71 
such that — Z ^ n ^ JA(z/) ^  0. Next, we claim that there exists i g  72 such that 
the arc ViVj exists in the associated allocation graph T(E (z l ), R). That is, we 
claim that there is 7 Ç 72 with ¿6  7, such that — Z ^ D ^ ^ z1) ^  0, and for any 
7' C 7 such that i g there is some m 6 7 /7 ' such that —Z% n $ " ( z / ) ^  0. 
We can construct such a subset 7 as follows. First, recall that there is some
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i' 6  7 such that — Z\ fl «^ (z 7) i 1 0- If *' € 71, set 7 =  i, and j  =  i'. If 
on the other hand i' € 72, consider Â =  {z, *'}. By irreducibility, either 3 
j  € 71 such that — ZA n $ \ {z ')  ^  0, in which case set 7 =  Ïït or 3It" € I2 /I\ 
such that —Z A fl ^  0, in which case consider 72 =  {z, z', z "}. By ir­
reducibility, either 3 j  e  71 such that — ZA D $^(z; ) ^  0, in which case set 
I  =  72, or 3il" € 72/7 2 such that —Z*A n $ A' (zr) ^  0 , in which case consider 
h  =  By repeating this process if necessary, we can find /„  such
that 3 j  € 71 such that —Z'A D &A{z') ^  0 and set 7 =  /„ . By construction, 
this subset satisfies the condition that for any / '  C 7 such that i 6  / ' ,  there 
is some m e 7 /7 ' such that — n <t>™(z7) ^  0. Therefore, the arc UjWj exists 
in the associated allocation graph r(T?(z7), R). By irreducibility, this is true 
for any non-trivial partition of the set of individuals {7 1,7 2}, and for any 
feasible attainable allocation z1 € A. Therefore, by lemma 5, the allocation 
graph T(E (zl ) ,R )  is strongly connected, for all feasible attainable alloca­
tions z 1 6  A. Conversely, assume that the allocation graph r(i? (z7), R) is 
strongly connected, for all feasible attainable allocations z1  e A. By lemma 
5, at a feasible attainable allocation z ' , for every non-trivial vertex partition­
ing {7 1,72}, we can find some i 6  72 and j  e  7, such that, 37 C 7, with i e  7 
, such that — ZA n &A(z') ^  0, and for any 7' C 7 with i € / ' ,  there is some
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m G / / / '  such that —ZA D $™(z') /  0. Therefore, there exists 7 C 72 and 
j  G 7 1 such that —Zjjn fc7, ^ 7) #  0. But then, there exists w € ZA such that 
z3 =  z3 — w and u3 (z3) >  u3 (z3). By assumption z r' =  — z 1* with z1' G Z i l , 
z ' 2 G Zj^. Define z'7’ =  z7< Vj' G / l / j  and z'3 =  z7. Then, z"' =  —z ' 2 — w 
while, by construction, u3'(z3') >  u3'(z3') for all j '  G 71, and u3 {z'3) > u3 (z3) 
as required. As this construction works at any feasible attainable allocation 
z l , and by assumption r (£ ’(z/ ),Z2) is strongly connected at every feasible 
attainable allocation z 1  G A, the economy E  is irreducible. ■
We now show that C-irreducibility and Gottardi and Hens’ irreducibility 
are different conditions, that is, neither condition implies the other.
To see that irreducibility does not necessarily imply C-irreducibility, sup­
pose the economy E  with asset returns matrix R is irreducible and consider 
the price graph of the economy at prices (p, q),ps G 3?^+ n 5 L, s =  1,..., S, q G 
Q n S J. Consider a non-trivial partition of the set of individuals { / ’ , I2}  with 
/ ’ =  {¿ } , 72 =  7 / { z}, and a feasible allocation z1 which implies an attainable 
affordable utility maximising net trade for individual i. Irreducibility implies 
that 3j  G 72 such that j  G 7, i G 7/7, — Z\ fl $ ‘ (p, q) /  0 and for any / '  such 
that j  G there is some m G 7 /7 'such that —Z'A D ^ ( z 7) yf 0, and since 
<t^(z7) C  $*(p,g), by construction, an arc exists from 72 to I 1. Now consider
I r r e d u c i b i l i t y  i n  E x c h a n g e  E c o n o m i e s 82
a feasible allocation z '1, which implies an attainable affordable utility max­
imising net trade for some j  € I 2. Irreducibility implies that 3A: £ / 2 such 
that i £ / ,  k £ / / / ,  —Z'A D $ kA{z‘ ) /  0, and for any / '  C /  such that i £ 7, 
there is some m £ / / / '  such that — ZA n <b™(z’ ) /  0. However, there is no 
guarantee that k =  j ,  and no guarantee therefore that an arc exist from /* 
to I 2, so that the price graph at (p , q),pa € 5i++ C\SL, s =  1,.... 5, q £ Q n S -7 
may fail to be strongly connected, in which case C-irreducibility fails.
To see that the reverse is not true either, that is, C'-irreducibility does 
not necessarily imply irreducibility, consider the following example:
E xam ple 42 Let I — {1 ,2 ,3 }, S — {1 ,2 ,3 }, L — {1 }, =  -I- 22 -I- 23 -I-
u 2 =  Z\ +  Z2 +  323 +  9 , U3 =  Z\ +  22 +  ¿3 +  §, Z 1 =  {2  : z \  >  —1 ,2 }  ^  
- 1 , 4  >  - 5 } ,  Z 2 =  {2  : z \  >  - 3 , 2 ^  >  1 , 2 !  >  - | } ,  Z 3 =  {2 : 2? >
—l , 2 f  >  0 ,23 >  —5 }, and /? = 1 1
\° V
Set ps — 1, s =  1,2,3. From
f/ie no arbitrage condition, Q =  3R+. Therefore, asset prices are restricted to 
(<?i,<Î2) £ ÎÎ+ H S2, or q =  ^  >  0 . /It any q >  0 , the arcs V\V2 ,V\V3 ,V2V\ 
always exist as preferences are strongly monotone over consumption in each
state s. Any transfer o f the commodity in state 3 from individual 3 to in­
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dividual 2, reduces the amount o f the good in state 1 for individual 2. For 
individual 2  we can write z2 =  y 2,z| =  y\ +  t/f,zf =  y\, and therefore, at 
any q >  0 , individual 2  maximises 2 (y2 +  2j/|), subject to y\ 4 - qy\ = 0 , 
- 3  <  Vi <  2, - 1  <  2/i +  y\ <  1, - J  < y\ < §. When q <  2, at any 
optimum for individual 2 , y\— \ and y\ =  — ^  < —3. If q =  2 , ant/ feasible 
combination of y\ and y\ such that y\ +  gt/f =  0> an optimum. If q >  2, 
ai ant/ optimum y\ =  — j  ami ¡/2 =  |. eac/i g >  0, individual 3 can make 
individual 2 better off by reducing y\ slightly, and increasing y\. Thus, for 
any (p ,q ), the arc V3V2 exists, the price graph Y(E(p, q), R) is strongly con­
nected, and the economy is therefore C-irreducible. However, the economy 
is not irreducible. To see this, consider the partition I x =  {1 ,2 } , / 2 =  {3 }. 
Individual 3 is unable to make individual 1 better off at any feasible allo­
cation. Moreover, at the feasible allocation z 1 =  (3,0,0), z2 =  (—3,0,0),
,3 _ (0 ,0 ,0), any transfer of the commodity in state 3 from individual 3
to individual 2 results in a net trade that lies outside Z\. Nevertheless, a 
competitive equilibrium exists: qm =  l.t/*1 =  ( 5 , —|),J/*2 =  (— l ,| ) ,y *3 =
( i - i ) . p *  =  ( 1 .U ),**1 - ( M . - i ) , * *  = ( - 1 , -£ ,§ )• * “  =  ( U . - i ) -
By modifying the definition of an arc in the price graph, we can however 
derive an alternative condition, sufficient for existence, which is in fact weaker
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than irreducibility.
D efinition 43 (modified price graph) The modified price graph of the ex­
change economy E with asset returns matrix R at prices (p,q ), denoted 
T'(E(p,q), R), is a collection of vertices V and arcs A such that each vertex 
Vi corresponds to consumer i for i - 1,2, ...I and an arc directed from Vi to 
Vj exists whenever either (i) i can make j  better off, in the sense that there 
is some I  C  I,with i G / ,  j  6  / / /  such that —Z'A PI 4>J(p , q) ^  0, and for any 
/ '  C  I  such that i G / ' ,  there is some m G / / / '  such that —ZA n $ m(p, q) /  0, 
or (ii) there is some k0, who can make j  better off in the sense outlined 
in (i), and in addition, for any feasible attainable allocation z 1 such that 
z* G ZA(p,q), there is some sequence of individuals (k\, ki, ..., k\), such that 
(a) i G / ,  k s  G I/I with —Z'A PI 4>^ v( i i ) /  0 and for any / '  C  /  such 
that i G / ' ,  there is some m G / / / '  such that —ZA PI <f>A( z a n d  (b) Vfcn, 
kn G / ,  &„_! G I/I with —Z'A Pi z3) ^  0 and for any / '  C  /  such that
kn G / ' ,  there is some m G I/I' such that —ZA PI $ 4  (z ')■
D efinition 44 (C‘ -irreducibility) The economy E with asset returns matrix 
R is C ’-irreducible if V(E(p, q), R) is strongly connected for all (p ,q ),p , € 
PI SL, s =  1..... S, q G Q PI SJ.
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For ease of exposition, let arcs defined as per (i) in the above definition 
of a modified price graph be called direct arcs, and arcs defined as in (ii) be 
called indirect arcs.
P roposition  45 If the economy E with incomplete markets satisfies assump­
tions A1 — A5 and B 6  — B9, and in addition is C'-irreducible, then a com­
petitive equilibrium exists.
P roof. Under assumptions .41 — .45 and B 6 — B 8  a quasi-equilibrium 
(p, q, z ' , y),exists with p 0, (Gottardi and Hens (1996)). From B9 it fol­
lows that at prices (p, q) there is some i for whom IntBo{p,q, R) ^  0 and 
therefore cost minimization implies utility maximization. Consider the par­
tition of the set of vertices of T(E (p ,q),R ), { V 1, V2} such that V 1 =  {uj : 
IntBo(p,q, R) ^  0}, and V2 =  {v* : IntB0(p,q, R) =  0}. We prove that V2 is 
empty. Suppose by contradiction that V2 is non-empty. By assumption the 
graph r'(E (p, q), R) is strongly connected and so, by lemma 5, there exists an 
arc from V 1 to V 2, and an arc from V 2 to V 1. It follows from the definition of 
C'-irreducibility that there exists v, € V2 and Vj 6  V 1 such that the ViVj exists 
in the graph r'(E (p ,q ), R). Given the definition of C"-irreducibility, ViVj may 
be a direct or an indirect arc. If VjVj is a direct arc then —Z'A D ^ (p , q) ^  0, 
with i 6  / ,  j  $. 1 and for any / '  C /  such that i € / ',  there is some m e  I/I'
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such that - Z A n<J>m(p, g) ^  0. Since individual j  is utility maximizing at z ' , 
it follows that there is an m0 g  /  such that vmo g F 1. But then, there exists 
a sequence of individuals (m i, .... mK) such that each vmk g l/ 1 and the arcs 
vmkvt, k =  1 , K  exist. Therefore Vi 6  V 1, a contradiction. If 
on the other hand ViVj is an indirect arc then there exists vt, g V 2 and 
Vj g  V 1 such that — Z'A n & (p , q) ^  0, with k0 g  / ,  j  $ /  and for any / '  C /  
such that 6  / ' ,  there is some m g / / / '  such that — Zjj fl $ m(jJ, q) /  0 
(so that by the previous argument g l /1), and for any feasible attainable 
allocation z1 such that z* g ZA(p,q), there is some sequence of individuals 
(ki, k2, ..., k/v), such that — Z\ n  (z1) 0 and — Z kA n  $^n_l (z/ ) ^  0, so
that each g V 1, n =  1,..., TV, and thus va g V 1, a contradiction. ■
We now show that C'-irreducibility is weaker than Gottardi and Hens’ 
irreducibility.
P roposition  46 Irreducibility implies C'-irreducibility.
P ro o f. Suppose the economy is irreducible. Consider prices {p ,q),pa € 
5R++ n  SL,s  =  1 ,...,S ,q  g Q D SJ, and a non-trivial partition of the set 
of vertices {V ^ V 2}. Consider the feasible attainable allocation z 1 , which 
implies an attainable affordable utility maximising net trade for individual 
j ,  where Vj g V2. Since (p, q), { V 1, V2}, and j  were chosen arbitrarily, to
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establish that the economy is ¿"-irreducible, it is sufficient to show that 
there is some £ V 1 such that the arc vtVj exists in the modified price 
graph T'(E (p,q), R). By irreducibility, either there exists £ V 1 such that 
—Z'A n  $ A(zr) 7^  0, with i € 7, j  € 7/7 and for any 7' C  7 such that 
i € / ' ,  there is some m £ / / / '  such that — ZA n ^ A(zy) ^  0, - in which 
case the arc v^vj exists and we are done - or there exists v*0 £ V 2 such that 
-Z 'A i~l (z1) /  0, with k0 £ 7, j  £ 7/7 and for any 7' C  7 such that i 6  
there is some m £ 7 /7 ' such that —ZA fl $ A (z! ) 0, in which case the arc
vkoVj exists in the modified price graph F'(E (p,q), R). Now, irreducibility 
implies that either there exists v, £ V 1 such that —ZA fi (z1) ^  0 , with 
i £ / ,  j  £ I  and for any 7' C  7 such that i £ / ' ,  there is some m  £ 7 / / '  
such that —ZA f~l $ A(zr) ^  0 , - in which case the arc Vjt/j exists and we are 
done - or there exists v*, £ V2 such that — Z'A fl $^°(zi ) /  0, with &i £ /,  
k0 £ I  and for any 7' C /  such that ki £ 7', there is some m £ 7 /7 ' such that 
—ZA PI <I>™(z1) ±  0, in which case the arc v^Vj exists in the modified price 
graph r'(E (p ,q), R). If we repeat this process, we end up with a sequence 
of individuals (k0, kl tk2 , k \ ) ,  with kn £ 7l , n =  0,1,..., N, such that V&„, 
kn £ 7, /zn_i £ 7 /7  with — Z'A n $ A"~‘ (zJ) ^  0 and for any 7' C 7 such that 
£ / ' ,  there is some m £ 7 /7 ' such that — FI <J>A( z I n  addition, we
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have k0 € / ,  j  G 7/7 and for any / '  C /  such that i e / ' ,  there is some 
m 6 / / / '  such that — n /  0. Consider the partition {7 2', 72a} of
72, where I2' =  {fc0, kx, k2 , ..., &n }  and I 2* — I 2/I2' . By construction, no arcs 
exist from / 2l to 72j in the allocation graph T(E(zJ), R). By irreducibility, 
an arc must exist from 71 fl 72a to I2' . It follows therefore that there exists 
Vi € V 1 such that - Z lA f~l $*"(27) 0, with i € I, kn € I/ I  and for any
7' C 7 such that i € / ',  there is some m e / / / '  such that — D $™ (z') ^  0, 
for some kn in the sequence, and therefore the arc t\Vj exists. ■
Example 42 illustrates that the reverse is not true, that is, ¿"-irreducibility 
does not imply irreducibility. Intuitively, the sense in which C'-irreducibility 
is weaker than irreducibility is that whereas irreducibility requires a partic­
ular relationship to hold between every pair of individuals at every feasible 
allocation, C'-irreducibility only requires a relationship to hold between any 
pair of individuals for some subset of feasible allocations, which contains the 
set of quasi-equilibrium allocations.
3.3 Effectively complete markets
In this section, we study the restrictions on the collection of allocation graphs 
of an economy with incomplete asset markets, sufficient to guarantee effective
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completeness.
Let R  denote the set of all asset returns matrices whose rank is S. Let 
(q ,p ,y ,z ')  denote a competitive equilibrium with complete markets, that is, 
when the asset returns matrix R is in R. Observe that for R , R! in R, at 
any feasible attainable allocation z1, r ( E , z I,R)  =  T(E, z ' , R').
D efinition 47 (Arc preserving asset markets) The asset returns matrix R 
is arc preserving if for every feasible allocation zr, 3 a subset A of arcs of 
T(E(z ‘ ) ,R)  such that (i) arcs in A strongly connect T(E(zI), R) (ii) if ViVj 
is an arc in A, then i\Vj is an arc in T(E(zI), R).
It follows that if the asset returns matrix R is arc preserving and V(E(zl ), R) 
is strongly connected at every feasible attainable allocation z1, then so is 
r (E(zI), R). Note that z continues to be a competitive equilibrium com­
modity allocation for any asset returns matrix R in R . Let Z  be the set 
of all competitive equilibrium commodity allocations for any asset return 
matrix R in R.
D efin ition  48 (effectively complete asset markets) Consider an asset re­
turns matrix R £ R  and let Z"R be the associated set of all competitive equi­
librium commodity allocations. If Z =  Z"R, then the asset returns matrix R
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is effectively complete.
P roposition  49 Consider an asset returns matrix R £ R . If R is arc pre­
serving, then markets are effectively complete.
P roof. As R is arc preserving, at each z ‘  € Z  there is subset of arcs 
A  of the allocation graph T(E(z' ) ,R)  such that if V{Vj is an arc in A , then 
ViVj is an arc in r ( E ( z I), R). This implies that at each feasible allocation 
z 1 £ Z, zl £ Z\, for all i £ / ,  that is, each z' £ Z  is attainable with the 
asset returns matrix R. For any z 1 £ Z, let (<?, p, y, be a competitive 
equilibrium for some R  in R. By (N A C ), q =  RT9, for some 9 £ SR*+. 
Let q' — RT9. For each i £ / ,  define r* =  {piz[, ...,ps zls )T. As z1 £ Z is 
attainable, r* £ Range R. Choose yn, ..., such that r* =  ilfjpi^Ry1'
for each i =  1 — 1, and y "  =  — y’x — ... — Then, (q',p,y',zI)
is a competitive equilibrium with the asset returns matrix R. Therefore, 
Z  C Z'R. As R is arc preserving, Range R C Range R, for all R in R. 
For any z 1 € Z'R, let {q,p, y , z I) be a competitive equilibrium with R. By 
(N A C ), set q =  R9, for some 9 £ 3i++ . Let q^ =  RT9. For each t € I, 
define =  (piz\, ...,psz's )T. As z1 £ Z  is attainable, £ Range R. 
Choose yn, ..., y'^~1^ such that =  f l(p.i)Ryn for each t =  1 ,.. . , /  — 1, and
y "  =  —yn — ... — Then, {q'^,p,y' , z')  is a competitive equilibrium
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with the asset returns matrix R. By construction, this true for each R  in R. 
Therefore, Z J c Z .  ■
3.4 Conclusion
Although strongly monotone preferences are sufficient to circumvent the 
minimum-wealth problem brought about by boundary endowments in economies 
with a complete set of asset markets, with incomplete markets this is no 
longer true. The incompleteness of markets may limit the possibility of agents 
attaining some feasible net trades. In order to prove existence of competitive 
equilibria, one must therefore appeal to some form of irreducibility condition 
which takes account of the attainability of trades. We propose a sufficient 
condition, C-irreducibility, a joint restriction on preferences, endowments, 
and the asset structure. This condition is neither stronger nor weaker than 
the alternative survival assumption presented by Gottardi and Hens. How­
ever, by a modification in the definition of an arc, we are indeed able to 
provide a weaker sufficient condition, C'-irreducibility. Finally, we apply our 
graph theoretic techniques to provide a sufficient condition for asset markets
to be effectively complete.
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4 Finite Pure Exchange Economies with Restricted 
Participation
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the impact of restricted participation in markets on 
the existence of competitive equilibria. In practice, individuals’ participation 
in markets is subject to a wide range of diverse institutional restrictions such 
as age restrictions for the purchase of cigarettes and alcohol.
With restricted participation, the set of net trades which are attainable 
for an individual i at prices p may be only a subset of their budget set, 
and may vary discontinuously with prices. This discontinuous dependence of 
attainable allocations on prices may cause the existence of competitive equi­
libria to fail. An economy with an incomplete set of asset markets is a special 
case of an economy with restricted participation, in which all individuals face 
the same participation constraints generated by the asset market structure. 
Discontinuities in the correspondence of attainable allocations therefore oc­
cur at the same prices for all individuals. When participation constraints 
are heterogeneous across agents, discontinuities in the correspondence of at­
tainable allocations will of course occur at different commodity prices for
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different individuals. In effect, equilibrium prices must be able to perform a 
dual role. Not only must they adjust to attain market clearing, but also to 
ensure that the net demands of unrestricted individuals in each market be 
consistent with the limits imposed by the restrictions on other individuals in 
that market.
The existence of competitive equilibria in economies with restricted par­
ticipation in asset markets has been studied in the literature by Balasko, Cass 
and Siconolfi (1990), Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997), and Cass, Siconolfi 
and Villanacci (2001), with the assumption that individuals have interior 
endowments. We consider a pure exchange economy without uncertainty, in 
which individuals have strongly monotone preferences and boundary endow­
ments. We assume linear homogeneous constraints on participation in mar­
kets (as in Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990)), that is, an individual either 
can or can not participate in any particular market. In the absence of market 
restrictions, competitive equilibria can be shown to exist in our framework, 
under standard Arrow-Debreu assumptions. However, as we illustrate via an 
example, when participation in markets is restricted, additional conditions 
are required to ensure existence with boundary endowments. In particular, 
some form of C-irreducibility condition is required. This condition must be
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formulated to take into account the restrictions on net trades imposed, and 
is therefore a joint restriction on the attainability structure of the economy 
and the distribution of endowments.
4.2 The Economy
Consider a pure exchange economy E, with individuals denoted by i € I =  
{ 1 , . . . , / } ,  and commodities denoted by / € L =  {1, where I, and L
are non-empty, finite sets.
The commodity space, denoted 3tL, is the Euclidean space with dimension 
equal to the number of commodities.
Trades in commodities are denoted by, z  =  (21, ...,2£,) e 9tIj.
An individual, i, is characterized by (i) a feasible trade set, Z' C 3?*", (ii) 
a utility function, u' : Z' —> 5R, and (iii) a participation constraint M' C 5Ri', 
where M* is an U  dimensional linear subspace of 3 with 0 < L' <  L. 
Note that L' > 0 implies that each individual can participate in at least one 
market. Let M  =  (M 1, ..., M ' , ..., M 1) denote the attainability structure of 
the economy.
For 1 6 / ,  let Z'+ denote the restriction of individual i ’s net trade set to 
the non-negative orthant, and let ZJ denote the projection of Z' on the Zth
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coordinate.
For any non-empty subset of the set of individuals /  C l ,  let Z 1 — S i€/Z '. 
The aggregate domain of trades in commodities is denoted Z.
A 1 For each i £ / ,  the set of feasible trades, Z\ is closed, convex, bounded 
below, (3z* £ Z' : z' < 0, z' ^  0, z' > zl Vz* £ Z', and z* <C z' Vz* ^
Z') and allows for free disposal (z 6 Z', z' > z => z' € Z l).
A2 Autarchy is feasible (0 £ Z l). 0 £ Int.Z.
A3 The utility function, u\ is continuous.
A4 The utility function, u\ is quasi-concave (u*(z') > u'(z) =>• u'{\z' +  (1 — 
A)z) >  u*(z), 0 <  A <  1).
A5 The utility function, u\ satisfies local non-satiation ({z ' £ Zx : u'(z') > 
ul(z), | z' -  z |< e, Ve >  0} ^  0).
A6 The utility function, u', is strictly monotonically increasing (z' > z => 
u'(z') >  u '(z)).
A7 For each / £ L, 3» £ /  such that ZJ fl M* ^  0.
A8  3/ £ L such that Z\/Z\ D A/' ^  0 and Z\ n ^  0 for some i , j  £ I,
with i /  j .
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Assumption A7 ensures that in each market there is at least one indi­
vidual whose participation is not restricted. Although this assumption is 
not directly employed in the proof of existence of equilibrium, without it it 
is difficult to see why one would want to differentiate a particular good as 
an economic object. Assumption .48 simply states that there is at least one 
market in which two individuals can trade, with one of those individuals able 
to supply positive amounts of the good.
An allocation is a vector, (z')  =  {z ‘ 6  Z 1 : i 6  I}, of individuals’ net 
trades. An allocation is feasible if and only if Ei6 /z ' =  0. A net trade for 
individual i, z' g Z ' , is attainable if z* g M* n  Z ' . Let Z\ =  M' fl Zl denote 
the set of attainable trades of individual i. An allocation z1 is attainable if 
z' g Z\ for all i g / .  Let ZA =  { z 1 : Ei6/z ‘ = 0 ,  z' € Z\, Vi g 1} denote 
the set of all feasible attainable allocations.
Prices are p g D?£/{0}.
Definition 50 A competitive equilibrium in an economy with restricted par­
ticipation is a pair (p*,zml) such that,
(i) Vi g I, p -z "  <  0, and u’ (z*‘ ) >  u'(z') for any z' € Z lA such thatp-z' <  0,
(ii) z*‘  e  ZA.
The definition of a quasi-equilibrium is as in definition X .l, replacing (i)
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with (i') p • z "  <  0, and u‘ (z*’ ) >  u'(z') for any z' e  Z\ such that p • z' <  0, 
or p ■ z "  < p ■ z' for all z' € Z\, * =  1 , I .
4.3 Existence of equilibrium
In an economy without restricted participation, assumptions A1-A6 are suf­
ficient to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Although 
individuals may have boundary endowments, assumption A 6  ensures that 
the economy is irreducible. However, with restricted participation, A1-A6 
are no longer sufficient for existence, as the following example illustrates.
Exam ple 51 Let I  =  {1 ,2 }, L — {1 ,2 ,3 }, u*(z) — z[ +  2z\ +  2z{ +  5, 
u2(z ) =  z\ +  zf 4- z\ +  1, Z x =  {z  : z\ >  —1, z\ > —1, z\ > —1}, Z2 — {z  : 
>  0, z\ >  0, z| > —1}, M 2 =  5R3, A/ 1 =  {z  € Ï?3 : z\ =  0}. Without any 
restriction on individuals ’ participation in markets, a competitive equilibrium 
in this economy (p*,z*r) exists with p* =  V2 — z *1 =  (—1 , 0 , 1), and
z ’ 2 =  (1 ,0 ,—1). However, given the restriction on participation in markets, 
the allocation z*' is not attainable. Since individual 1 cannot trade in the 
market for good 3, equilibrium prices must be such that individual S’s excess 
demand for each good be zero. Given individual 2 ’s preferences, this is only
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true for prices pi =  p-j =  p$. However, at these prices markets do not clear 
since 2} =  —1, whereas zj =  0. With restricted participation therefore there 
are no prices which clear markets, and a competitive equilibrium for this 
economy fails to exist.
Despite strongly monotone preferences, with restrictions on participation 
irreducibility may fail since the restriction may limit the net trades which 
are attainable. In example 51, although there are net trades z G — (Z 3 n A /2) 
such that u1(z 1 +  z) > u ^ z 1) for all z1 € Z 1 CI M 1, given the restriction on 
individual l ’s participation in the market for good 3, (z 1 + z )  ^ Z i C M l, for 
all z G — (Z2 fl A /2), z 1 G Z 1 n M l. Therefore, individual 2 can never make 
individual 1 better off. With restricted participation, the C-irreducibility 
condition must be reformulated to take into account the restrictions on net 
trades.
Let Z\(jp) =  {z 1 G Z\C\ZA : pz' < 0}, denote the set of feasible attainable
trades of individual i which are affordable at prices p, and Z\(p) =  {z* £
Z'A(p) : z' Gargmax u*(z)}, denote those affordable feasible attainable trades 
! ‘ez'A(p)
for individual i which yield the most utility. We then define, $ ’ (?) =  {z  £ 
Z\ : u*(z* + z) > ti'(z‘ ),Vz* G Z\(p)} as the set of attainable trades which 
when added to any utility maximizing affordable feasible attainable trade
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at prices p, make individual i better off. Weak monotonicity (a sufficient 
condition) and local non-satiation (a sufficient condition) imply that this set 
is non-empty.
D efinition 52 (price graph) The price graph of the exchange economy E 
with attainability structure M at prices p, denoted T(E(p), M ), is a collection 
of vertices V and arcs A such that each vertex Vi corresponds to consumer i 
for i — 1 , 2 ,..., I  and an arc directed from vt to Vj exists whenever there is 
some I C I,with i € I , j  € I / /  such that —Z'A PI $-*(p) /  0, and for any 
/ '  C /  such that i 6  / ' ,  there is some m € / / / '  such that —ZA D $ m(p) ^  0.
Let C  denote the collection price graphs of economy E, at all prices
p6 3^/{0}.
D efinition 53 (C-irreducibility) The economy E with attainability structure 
M  is C-irreducible if each member of C  is strongly connected.
Note that the above definition differs from the definition of C-irreducibility 
in the way the index sets are defined.
P roposition  54 If the economy E with attainability structure M satisfies 
assumptions A1 — /18, and in addition is C-irreducible, then a competitive
equilibrium exists.
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P roof. Under assumptions .41 — .46 a quasi-equilibrium (p, z1),exists. 
Assumption A8  ensures that at prices p  there is some i for whom 3z' g 
Z\ fl Za such that pz' < 0. Consider the partition of the set of vertices 
of r {V l, v 2} such that V 1 =  : 3zi g Zj, s.t. p V  < 0},
and V2 — {v, : $z' g Z\ s.t. p*z' <  0}. We prove that V 2 is empty. 
Suppose by contradiction that V2 is non-empty. By assumption the graph 
r (E(p) , M ) is strongly connected and so, by lemma 5, there exists an arc 
from V2 to V 1, and vice versa. In particular, there exists Vi g V 2 and 
Vj g V 1 such that ViVj exists. Given the way arcs are defined, the existence 
of ViVj implies that — Z‘A fl & (p) ^  0, with i g / ,  j  £ I  and for any / '  C /  
such that i g there is some m g / / / '  such that —Z^’ ("I $ m(p) ^  0. Since 
individual j  is utility maximizing at z1, it follows that there is an m0 6  I  such 
that vmo g V 1. But then, there exists a sequence of individuals (mi, 
such that — Z\ fl $ mK (p) ^  0, and — Z^*‘  n ^  0. Therefore, each
Vmt € V 1, the arcs vmkvmk_t, ViVmK, k =  1 .....K  exist, and thus Uj g V 1, a
contradiction. ■
Note that the economy of example 51 is not C-irreducible. At any vector 
of prices p g K + /{0 }, the price graph r (E (p ),M ) has a unique vertex Viu2.
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4.4 Conclusion
In an economy with participation constraints and boundary endowments 
competitive equilibria may fail to exist, even with the assumption of strongly 
monotone preferences. However, we develop a condition, C-irreducibility 
which is sufficient to guarantee existence, a condition which implies joint re­
strictions on the attainability structure of the economy and the distribution
o f endowments.
Chapter 5
Pure Exchange Economies with Countable Sets of 
Individuals and Commodities
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5 Pure Exchange Economies with Countable Sets of 
Individuals and Commodities
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we extend our analysis to pure exchange economies with 
countable sets of individuals and economies. The argument for the exis­
tence of competitive equilibria in infinite dimensional economies proceeds by 
considering a sequence of finite truncated economies which tend to the full 
economy in the limit. The first step in the proof is to demonstrate the exis­
tence of competitive equilibria for each of the finite truncated economies in 
the sequence, which would require that each economy in the sequence satisfy 
some form of irreducibility condition. The second step is to show that the 
limit of the sequence of competitive equilibria for the finite economies is a 
quasi-equilibrium for the full economy. Assuming some form of irreducibility 
of the full economy is then sufficient for a quasi-equilibrium to constitute a 
competitive equilibrium for the full economy. In the literature, some authors 
prove existence of competitive equilibria by assuming irreducibility of the 
full economy alone (Burke (1988); Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991)). 
Others (Wilson (1981); Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980)) assume some form
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of irreducibility of the truncated economies.
We modify the definition of C-irreducibility to allow for a countable in­
finity of individuals. We show that an economy which is approximated by 
some sequence of finite C-irreducible economies will not necessarily be itself 
C-irreducible. Assuming C-irreducibility of the finite truncated economies 
alone is therefore not sufficient to prove existence of competitive equilibria 
in infinite dimensional economies, unless, that is, one imposes some addi­
tional restriction on the sequence of truncated economies. We characterise 
some such condition in terms of restrictions on price graphs. Broadly speak­
ing, the restriction implies that links between individuals in any given finite 
economy cannot be arbitrarily broken as “new” individuals are introduced.
Subsequently, we show that C-irreducibility of an infinite dimensional 
economy does not necessarily imply the existence of an increasing sequence 
of finite truncated C-irreducible economies which tend to the full economy 
in the limit. We develop an additional restriction on the preferences and 
endowments of individuals in the infinite dimensional economy such that it 
may indeed be approximated by an increasing sequence of finite truncated C- 
irreducible economies. The key restriction here is that there must be sufficient
arcs across truncated economies.
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The results of this chapter, lead us to conclude that when working with 
infinite dimensional economies it is far less restrictive to prove the existence 
of competitive equilibria by imposing some form of irreducibility condition 
on the full economy alone.
In order to prove our results for infinite dimensional economies, we needed 
results for infinite dimensional graphs which we were unable to find in the lit­
erature. In section two, we present our results for countably infinite directed 
graphs. In section three, we apply our results for infinite directed graphs 
to study C-irreducibility in pure exchange economies with countable sets of 
commodities and individuals. Finally, in section 4, we conclude.
5.2 Results for infinite graphs
Definition 55 (infinite directed graph) An infinite directed graph is a pair 
T =  (V, A) of a vertex set, V, and a binary relation, A, on V, such that VUA  
is infinite.
Note that, by definition, an arc set can only be infinite if the vertex set is 
infinite. Hence, an infinite graph is essentially a graph with an infinite vertex 
set. We restrict attention to graphs with a countable infinity of vertices.
Observe that the definitions of a path, a cycle, a subgraph, and a strongly
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directed graph, presented in chapter 2 for finite graphs, extend trivially to 
infinite directed graphs, with obvious modifications.
We first define an increasing sequence of graphs in terms o f set inclusion.
Definition 56 (increasing sequence of finite graphs) A sequence of finite 
graphs ( Tm =  (Vm, /lm)) is increasing if Vi C V2 C ... C Vm C Vm+1 C .... 
and ( ¿ i  I~1 A2) C {A2 O A3) C ...(Am D 4 m+1) C ..., where A m Cl / im+i /  0, 
for all m > 1.
Note that the above definition implies that if two subsequent graphs, Tm 
and r m+1, have a common subgraph, then F'„ is also a subgraph of all
r„, n > m + 1.
Definition 57 (convergence of an increasing sequence of finite graphs) An 
increasing sequence of finite graphs ( Tm = (V ,^, Am)), converges to the infi­
nite graph T =  (V, A) if and only if Vi C V2 C ... C Vm C Vm+i C ... C V =  
U “ =i Vm, and A =  U “ =i(^m n Am+1).
Note that there may be more than one increasing sequence o f finite graphs 
which converges to some infinite graph T. Our first observation is that a 
sequence of finite strong connected graphs may converge to an infinite graph 
which itself fails to be strongly connected.
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Exam ple 58 Consider the increasing sequence of finite strongly connected 
graphs ( Tm =  (Vm,A m)), where Vm - {1,2, and Am -  {vmVi,ViVi+l :
i =  1 , 2 — 1). Note that ( Tm =  (Vm,>lm)) satisfies the definition of 
an increasing sequence of graphs. That is, Vm C V'm+1 for all m, and (Am n 
Am+\) =  {Vjtij+i : i =  1, m -  1} C {i\vi+i : i =  1 , m}  =  (Am+1 D Am+f). 
Each graph Tm is strongly connected, and therefore - by lemma 4 of chapter 2 
- has a strongly connected spanning subgraph with vertex set Em. In this case, 
Em =  Am, that is, there is exactly one arc between any two distinct vertices 
Vi and Vj, and Fm is a spanning cycle. In each of the finite graphs in the 
sequence, strong connectedness depends on there being an arc from the “last” 
vertex to the “first. ” The infinite graph to which the sequence converges has 
no “last” vertex, and hence it fails to be strongly connected.
We can however impose conditions on an increasing sequence of finite 
strongly connected graphs, to guarantee that its limit be a strongly connected 
graph.
Lem m a 59 The infinite graph, F =  (V, >1), to which the sequence of finite 
strongly connected graphs, ( Tm =  {Vm, Am)) , converges, is itself strongly 
connected if for all m there exist strongly connected spanning subgraphs, F ,^, 
with arc set Em C Am, such that Em C Am+i.
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P roof. Take any two distinct vertices vit vj in the infinite graph, T. Then 
there exists some finite graph Tm in the sequence such that Vi,Vj e  Vm. By 
assumption, Tm is strongly connected, and therefore has at least one spanning 
subgraph. By definition, each strongly connected spanning subgraph contains 
paths of arcs connecting Vi to vJt and vice versa. By assumption, some such 
spanning subgraph, TJ„, has arc set Em C v4m+1, and so, by definition of an 
increasing sequence of graphs, Em C An, for any n > m +  1. In other words, 
the arcs connecting Vi to Vj in r 'n, are also contained in all graphs r n, for 
any n > m +  1, and therefore in the infinite graph I\ Since Vi and Vj were 
chosen arbitrarily, this is true for any pair of vertices in the infinite graph, 
and hence T is strongly connected. ■
The restriction imposed in lemma 59 implies that any arcs required to 
strongly connect a given finite graph in the sequence should be included in 
the vertex set of any subsequent graph in the sequence. Observe that in 
the increasing sequence of finite strongly connected graphs in example 58, 
vmv\ e  Em, but vmvi £ En for any n > m, and hence Em £  Am+y, and so 
the condition of lemma 59 is violated.
In fact, it is enough for strong connectedness of the infinite graph that 
all arcs required to strongly connect a given finite graph in the increasing
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reappear in the arc set of some larger graph later in the sequence and remain 
for ever after in the sequence. The following lemma presents a more formal 
statement of this requirement.
Lem m a 60 The infinite graph, F =  (V, A), to which the sequence of finite 
strongly connected graphs, ( Tm =  (Vm,A m)), converges, is itself strongly 
connected if there exist strongly connected spanning subgraphs, r^,, with arc 
set Em C Am, for all m, such that for all i\Vj £ Em, there exists n such that 
ViVj £ A„n A„', for all n' >  n.
P roof. Take any two distinct vertices vt, Vj in the infinite graph, T. Then 
there exists some strongly connected finite graph Fm in the sequence such 
that Vi,Vj £ Vm. Let be a strongly connected spanning subgraph of Tm. 
There exists a path of arcs in which connect v, to vj, and vice versa. By 
assumption, these arcs also connect and Vj in the graphs Fn and TJ,, or all 
n' > n. Therefore, a path of arcs from Vi to vj, and vice versa, exists in the 
infinite graph T. Since vt and u: were chosen arbitrarily, this is true for any 
pair of vertices in the infinite graph, and hence T is strongly connected. ■
We now show, by example, that a strongly connected infinite graph T 
cannot necessarily be approximated by an increasing sequence of strongly 
connected finite subgraphs ( r m).
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E xam ple 61 Consider the strongly connected infinite graph which is a span­
ning cycle. A spanning cycle has the property that if any v, 6  Vm is re­
moved, then the arcs Vj i^V, and V{Vi+i are also removed. Therefore, the 
graph T =  (V/v,, A v/{vi-\Vi, VjVi+i}) fails to be strongly connected. The 
only candidate sequence of strongly connected finite subgraphs to approxi­
mate T is the sequence ( Tm =  (Vm,A m)), where Vm =  {1 ,2 , and
A m =  {vmVi, v,v,+l : i =  1 , 2 — 1}. However, as illustrated in example 
58 above, the infinite graph to which this sequence converges is not strongly 
connected.
Our final lemma in this section provides a sufficient condition for a strongly 
connected infinite graph T to be the limit of an increasing sequence of finite 
strongly connected graphs.
Lem m a 62 Let Y =  (V, A) be a strongly connected infinite graph. If there ex­
ists a partition o fV , V  =  {Vf, Vi, ••■}, and a partition of A, A  — {A i, A2, ...}, 
such that r n =  (Vn, An) is a strongly connected subgraph of T, for all n, and 
in addition there exist arcs from Vn to Vn+i, and from Vn+i to Vn, then Y can 
be approximated by an increasing sequence o f finite strongly connected graphs.
P roo f. We can construct such a sequence as follows: Yi =  (Vf =  
Vu Al =  j4 i ) ,  Yi =  (Vi =  Vi U  Vi, Ai =  Ai U  Ai U  {v{Vj, VjVi : Vi G V\,Vj £
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Figure 4:
F2})»F 3 =  (V3 =  V j U V3, A3 =  A 2 U  A 3 U  {v iV j,V jV i : Vi €  V2, Vj 6 V3}), T4 =  
(V4 =  v3 U Vi, At =  A3 U a  U {viVj,VjVi : S Vs.v,- € V^}), T« =  (K, =
F n —1 tJ K i i  -^n =  ^ n —1 U  A n tJ { V jV j  j • V j £  1 1 V j €  F 7 1}) ®
As an example of an infinite strongly connected graph which satisfies 
the condition of lemma 62, consider T =  (V ,A ), where V  =  {1 ,...} , and 
A  =  {viVi+i,Vi+iVi : i =  1 ,...}, which can be approximated by the increasing 
sequence of finite strongly connected graphs T„ =  ({Vn,A n)), where V„ =  
,n }  and An =  {vjVj+i,Vj+iVj : i =  — 1}. The first 3 graphs in
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this sequence are illustrated in figure 4.
5.3 Truncations and graphs
In this section, we apply our results for infinite directed graphs, from the 
previous section, to study C-irreducibility in pure exchange economies with 
countable sets of commodities and individuals. We ignore production due to 
conceptual problems in the specification of the objective function of firms. 
Consider a pure exchange economy E, with individuals denoted by i G I =  
{1 ,...} , and commodities by l 6  L =  {1 ,...} , where 7 and L are both non­
empty, countable sets.
The commodity space, denoted A, is the Euclidean space with dimension 
equal to the number of commodities. The vector of units is 1, and 1; is the 
vector with 1 in the /th coordinate and zero elsewhere.
The commodity space is a topological vector space with the product topol­
ogy. A base for the product topology consists of the sets I I x n !eL/LF^i, 
where Oj C Af are open and Lp C L is finite.
Trades in commodities are denoted by, z =  (zi, . .. ,z /,.....) G A.
An individual, i, is characterized by a pair, (Z ',u *), for all t € 7, of a 
feasible trade set, Zl C A, and a utility function, ti‘ : Z' —»■ 5R .
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An economy is thus a collection, E  =  {I , L, (Z*, u*) : i € / } .
Overlapping generations economies are a special case of the above frame­
work. Time periods are denoted by t € Tt j =  If time extends
infinitely into the future but not into the past, that is j =  Tii00, we say 
the temporal structure is simple. An individual is identified by the period 
in which he/she is born, that is, individual i born at t is denoted (i, t). 
The set or “generation” of individuals born at t is denoted It, and the set 
of all individuals is thus I =  Uter^h- A commodity l available at t is de­
noted (l,t). The set of commodities available at t is denoted Lt, and the 
set of all commodities is L =  Utg^jLt. Periods of trade of an individual are 
T (M) =  {t(M)t c  Tt f, such that f  i  T ^  =►  Lt, n  =  0. The
trading span of an individual is 1 < +  1. The trading
span of an individual may therefore be infinite.
Assumptions A l  — A6 from section 2.3.1 extend to infinite dimensional 
pure exchange economies with the following necessary modifications to as­
sumptions A 1 and A3. Assumption A l is replaced by the following assump­
tion.
C l Z' is closed in the product topology.
Assumption A3 is replaced by the following assumption.
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C 2 u' : Z' —> 5R is continuous in the product topology.
In addition, we require two further assumptions.
C3 0 > >  —oo, for all / € L.
An individual does not desire a commodity l at z £ Zx if u'(z) =  u'(z — 
¿(I;), where zi >  0 and (z — 2|1() £ Z'. Let L' C L denote the set of 
commodities desired by individual i, somewhere in his/her net trade set. Let 
Di =  {i € /  : l € L'} denote the set of individuals who desire commodity l 
somewhere in their net trade sets.
C4 Di is finite, for l £ L.
An allocation is a profile of individual net trades, z1 =  { z l £ Z' : i £ I}. 
An allocation is feasible if and only if Ejg¡zx =  0. Let F  =  {z l : Ei6 /z* =  
0 , 2* £ Z',Vi £ 1} denote the set of all feasible allocations.
Prices are p £ P  =  A+ /{0 } .
Given prices p, an individual i £ I  solves the following maximization 
problem:
M a i (z} u'(z) s.t. pz < 0 , 2 £  Z (B)
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D efinition 63 A competitive equilibrium is a collection (p ',z mI) such that, 
(i) Given p’ , z "  solves (B ) for each i 6  I ;
(HPieiz* =  0.
The aggregate domain of trades in commodities is Z =  £ ie/Z '. At prices 
p € P, let Z'(p) =  {z' € Z 'fl—Z  : pz' <  0} denote the set of affordable trades 
for individual i which satisfy the aggregate feasibility constraint. Z'{p) =  
{z ‘ € Z'{p) : z' Gargmax u*(z)}, denotes those affordable feasible trades for 
individual i which give him/her the most utility. We then define, <f>‘ (p) =  
{z  G Z x : u'(z‘ +  z) >  u'(z'), z* € Z'(j>)} as the set of net trades which when 
added to some utility maximizing affordable feasible trade at prices p, make 
individual i better off. Local non-satiation (a sufficient condition) implies 
that this set is non-empty.
D efinition 64 (price graph) The price graph of the exchange economy E at 
prices p, denoted F(E(p)), is a collection of vertices V and arcs A such that 
each vertex Vi corresponds to consumer i for  ¿ =  1 , 2 ,... and an arc directed 
from Vi to Vj exists whenever there is some I  C I,with i G / ,  j  € / / /  such 
that —Z 1 PI &(p)  /  0, and for any / '  C I such that i € there is some 
m G / / / '  such that —Z v fl <£m(p) /  0 .
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Note that the above definition allows both finite and countably infinite 
economies. Let C  denote the collection of price graphs at all prices p £ P.
Definition 65 (C-irreducibility) The economy is said to be C-irreducible if 
every member of the collection of price graphs C is strongly connected, that 
is, i fT(E(p)) is strongly connected at all p £ P.
In contrast to the finite case, the assumption of continuity of the utility 
functions in the product topology restricts the set of economies which may be 
C-irreducible. For example, when individuals and commodities are indexed 
by calendar time which extends infinitely into the future, continuity in the 
product topology suggests “impatience,” which may prevent commodities 
whose indices are sufficiently far away from that of an individual with index 
t from entering «^ ‘ (p).
In order to draw comparisons between C-irreducible and irreducible economies 
with countable sets of individuals and commodities, we extend the definition 
of an allocation graph presented in section 2.3.2, to allow for an infinite 
dimensional vertex set.
Definition 6 6  ( allocation graph) The allocation graph of economy E at al­
location (z'), denoted Y(E(z! )), is a collection of arcs A and vertices V,
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where each vertex v, corresponds to consumer i for  ¡ 6 / ,  and an arc directed 
from Vi to Vj exists whenever there is some I  C  I ,with i £  / ,  j  £  1/1 such 
that ( - Z 1) D & (z ' )  ±  0, and for any / '  C  /  such that i £ there is some 
m £ / / / '  such that ( - Z v ) n  $ m(z') #  0.
We now define a truncated economy. Consider an economy E. To this 
economy we can associate a truncated economy En =  { / ” , Ln, (Z,n,u m) : j 6  
/ " } ,  constructed as follows. Consider a finite subset of the set of commodities 
Ln C L. Let A" C  A be the commodity subspace with dimension equal to 
the cardinality of L". Let / "  =  { « € / :  Z ’n A71 /  0 }. A truncation is said to 
be non-trivial if either Ln is a proper subset of L, or In is a proper subset of 
I, for some n. For a net trade z G A, zn =  proj\nZ. For a net trade zn € A", 
and an individual i 6  / ,  let ? “  £ A be the commodity bundle defined by zj" , 
for / £ Ln, and zj" =  0 for Z (f Ln. For prices p e  P, pn =  proj\*p. For prices 
pn £ P n =  A” /{0 } ,  we write p7* £ P for the prices defined by p|* for l £ Ln 
and p? =  0 for / £ Ln. Now define Z nl C A as Z ni =  {z ” £ A" : z™ £ Z'} 
with un' : Z m —>■ 1R. Observe that um(zn) =  u^z7“ ). An allocation in the 
truncated economy is z1" such that zm £ Z nl for all i £ / ” . An allocation is 
feasible if and only if Ei€/r.z* =  0 .
Consider a sequence (L" : Ln C Ln+l, n =  1 ,2,...) such that =  L.
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Consider the associated sequence of truncated economies (En : n =  1,2,...). 
Then, / "  Ç Jn+1, for all n =  1,2... and U ^ / "  =  / .  We say that the 
sequence of truncated economies (En : n =  1 , 2 ,...) converges to the economy 
E, and the corresponding sequence of prices (pn : n =  1,2...) converges to 
p 6  A+/ { 0 }  . Observe that by construction, each sequence of economies 
(E n : n =  1,2,...) has a unique limit economy E, and each sequence of prices 
(pn : n =  1,2...) has a unique limit p € P.
Now consider the truncated economy En and prices pn. We can associate 
to this economy the price graph T(En(pn). For notational simplicity, without 
ambiguity let Fn =  r (£ 'n(pn). For any sequence of truncated economies 
(E n : n =  1 , 2 ,...) and corresponding sequence of prices (pn : n =  1 , 2 ...) 
there is a corresponding sequence of price graphs (r„ : n =  1,2...). If E  and 
p are the corresponding limits, let r(£?(p)), the price graph corresponding 
to E and p, be defined as the limit of the sequence (rn : n =  1,2...). By 
construction, this limit exists and is unique.
Alternatively, consider the truncated economy En and allocation z1" . We 
can associate to this economy the allocation graph V(En(zr ). For any se­
quence of truncated economies (E n : n — 1 , 2 ,...) and corresponding sequence 
of allocations (z/n : n =  1 , 2 ...) there is a corresponding sequence of allocation
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graphs ( r (En(z,n) : n =  1 , 2...)- If E  and z' are the corresponding limits, let 
T(E(z')),  the allocation graph corresponding to E  and z l , be defined as the 
limit of the sequence (r(En(z/n) : n =  1,2...). By construction, this limit 
exists and is unique.
The argument for the existence of competitive equilibria in infinite di­
mensional economies proceeds by considering a sequence of finite truncated 
economies which tend to the full economy in the limit. The first step of 
the proof is to demonstrate the existence of competitive equilibria for each 
of the finite truncated economies. This requires that each finite truncated 
economy be irreducible/C-irreducible. The second step of the proof is to 
show that the limit of the sequence of competitive equilibria for the finite 
economies constitutes a quasi-equilibrium for the full infinite dimensional 
economy. Irreducibility/C-irreducibility of the full economy then guaran­
tees the existence of a competitive equilibrium. One can impose the C- 
irreducibility condition directly on the full economy, E, and/or one can as­
sume C-irreducibility of the truncated economies, (E n : n =  1 , 2 ,...).
Definition 67 (sequential C-irreducibility) An economy is sequentially C- 
irreducible if it is the limit of a sequence of truncated C-irreducible economies.
Similarly, an economy is said to be sequentially irreducible if it is the
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limit of a sequence of truncated irreducible economies.
In view o f example 58, we might expect that an economy which is sequen­
tially C-irreducibility may nevertheless fail to be C-irreducible. The following 
example illustrates that this is indeed the case.
Exam ple 6 8  Consider an overlapping generations economy in which time 
extends infinitely into the future. There are two commodities available each 
period, (l ,t ), for l =  1,2. Each period, an individual is bom, (1, <), with 
preferences
u( M )
— 2(l,t) +  2(2,i+l) — 1 for  0 <  2 (2,t+1), 2(l,t) 1 , 2 (2,t+1) +
=  ^ ‘V+zi, ---  f 0r 0 — Z(2,t+1) ^  2 ,0  <  2(ii() <  l ,2(2,i+i) +
2(1 ,*) < 1 
-2(1.0 ^  1
— z(2,t+i) for  2(2,t+i) > 2  or 2(i,t) >  1
and net trade set Z*1’^ =  {z  : z^J  >  —2 , z^ 'JJ > 0  for  (l , s ) (2 , f)}.
An additional individual is bom in period 1, with preferences u2 =  z^,i) ond 
net trade set Z 2 — {z  : z2lt  ^ >  —1/2, z22 > 0 for all f } . Observe that
individual ( 1 ,£) always desires commodity (2 , t +  1) but desires commodity 
(1, i) only as long as Z(2 ,t+i) < 2.
Any finite tmncated economy E l associated with the set of commodities Ll — 
{ (Z, £) : t =  1, is C-irreducible. To see this, note that at any prices p, 
the arcs V(i,t)t>(i,t-i) and i^ i .t )  exist in the associated price graphs. In other
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words, each price graph has the strongly connected graph pictured in figure 
5 as a spanning subgraph. Competitive equilibrium prices for the truncated 
economy El are p*f =  {p\{ =  (0,1 ) ,p ?  =  (0,1), =  (0, l),p|f =  (4,1))
and the associated equilibrium allocation is z*f'2 =  (z ( f '2 =  (—1/ 2 , 2 ), z ’^ '2 — 
(0 , 0 ) fo r  t /  1), =  (*^<l-*> =  (0 , - 2 ) , z $ M) =  (0 , 2),zif*  =  (0 , 0 ) for
s Ï  t, t +  1), for t =  1,2 , ...t -  1 and z miW  =  (¿;r,(1,i) =  (1/ 2 , - 2), =
(0 , 0 ) f o r t j i  t).
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The full economy E however, fails to be C-irreducible. At prices p =  (pt =  
(1,1), for all t), each individual ( l , f )  has the utility maximising feasible af­
fordable net trade z(M) =  (z£(l,1) =  (0, -2 ) ,  =  (0,2 ),z*f'2 =  (0,0) for
s ^  t,t 4-1). This means that no individual can be made better of by a net 
trade from individual 2. Thus, if we consider the partition { V 1 — v2, V 2 =  
V/{v2} }  of the vertex set of the associated price graph, there is no arc from 
V 1 to V 2, hence the price graph is not strongly connected.
Note also that no competitive equilibria exist for the full economy. To see 
this, suppose that p* were equilibrium prices. Since individuals 2 and (1, i) 
always desire commodities (2,1) and (2 ,t +  1) respectively p*2 ^ >  0. Since 
only individual 2 desires commodity (2,1), equilibrium requires that individ­
ual 2 have positive income at p ', that is p^  ^ > 0 for some t. However, 
since commodity (2, i) is only desired by individual (1, i — 1), equilibrium re­
quires that zjjt'+i) =  2, which in turn implies that nobody desires (l,t ) and 
so P(i,t) =  0, a contradiction. Note that as the period of truncation tends to 
infinity, equilibrium prices tend to limf^oop*' =  ((0,1), ( 0 ,1 ) , ( 0 ,1 ) , . . . )  at 
which individual 2 ’s revenue vanishes to zero.
Note that in the above example, each finite truncated economy is irre­
ducible in the McKenzie sense, whereas the full economy is not. In other
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words, the example also serves to illustrate that sequentially irreducibility 
does not necessarily imply irreducibility.
Here, we apply lemma 60 to provide a sufficient condition on the sequence 
of truncated economies such that sequential C-irreducibility does indeed im­
ply C-irreducibility of the full economy.
P roposition  69 Consider a sequence of strongly connected price graphs (T„ = 
(V„,A „ ) : n =  1,2,...) associated with the sequence of truncated economies 
(En : n =  1,2,...) and the corresponding sequence of prices (pn : n =  1,2...). 
r (£ (p ))  is strongly connected if for any n, there is a strongly connected span­
ning subgraph =  (Vn, A'n) C  Tn such that for all v,v3 €  A'n, there exists k 
such that ViVj 6 A^n A f o r  all k' > k.
P roof. By assumption, TJ, is strongly connected and therefore contains 
paths which connect to Vj, and vice versa for all Vi, Vj 6 Vn. By assumption, 
for some k, a path connecting vt and v} in TJ, is also contained in all graphs 
r*/ for all k' > k, and therefore in the graph V(E(p)). Since v, and vj were 
chosen arbitrarily, this is true for any pair of vertices in the infinite graph, 
and hence the infinite graph is strongly connected. ■
This restriction implies that any arc which is needed to strongly connect 
the price graph of some finite truncated economy reappears in the arc set
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of some price graph later in the sequence, and remains in the arc set of all 
subsequent price graphs. This rules out the possibility that the arcs which 
strongly connect the price graph in a finite truncated economy are artificially 
created by the way the economy is truncated. This condition is violated in 
example 67.
Despite the result that sequential irreducibility does not necessarily im­
ply irreducibility of the full economy, Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980) prove 
the existence o f competitive equilibria in infinite dimensional economies, im­
posing an irreducibility condition on the finite truncated economies alone, 
namely intertemporal irreducibility.
Definition 70 (intertemporal irreducibility (adapted from Balasko, Cass, 
and Shell (1980))) Let a t-economy be specified by the tastes and feasible 
net trade sets o f all individuals born up to and including period t, E t =  
{ I t,(Z ',u ') : i € It}. The infinite economy is intertemporally irreducible if 
there exists a subsequence of periods {£„} such that, given any tv — economy 
and any feasible allocation sequence z € Z for the infinite economy, then for  
any non-trivial partition o f the set of individuals {I}v, / £ } ,  there exists x' <  0 
for i 6 /£  and zH >  0 for i g such that,
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E .e / ‘ x 'ti =  0 whenever Ylie/' 1? ( =  0 for 1 <  t < tv +  1
E.e/?v ** < Eie/J. 4 i + £<e/,‘.
u'(zn) >  u'(z') for all i € / {2v 
u'(z'') >  u'(z') for some i £ /£
Note that intertemporal irreducibility implies that in the sequence of finite 
truncated economies, there is some subsequence of finite economies which are 
irreducible. This guarantees the existence of sequences of prices and alloca­
tions which constitute competitive equilibria for those finite economies. The 
limits of these sequences constitute a quasi-equilibrium for the full economy. 
In order to see why intertemporal irreducibility is sufficient for existence 
(without the assumption that the full economy E  be irreducible) we restate 
proposition 68 in terms of restrictions on allocation graphs.
Proposition  71 Consider a sequence o f strongly connected allocation graphs 
(r „  =  (Vn,A n) : n =  1,2,...) associated with the sequence of truncated 
economies (En : n =  1, 2,...) and the corresponding sequence of prices (zIn : 
n =  1,2...). r (E (z 1)) is strongly connected if for any n, there is a strongly 
connected spanning subgraph r|, =  (Vn, A'n) Ç Tn such that for all VjVj € A'n, 
there exists k such that ViVj e  y4*fl A*<, for all k' > k.
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Intertemporal irreducibility implies sufficient restrictions on the sequence 
of finite truncated economies such that the limit of the sequence is itself 
an irreducible economy. Since the allocation sequence, z e Z, is fixed in 
definition 69, any element of the vertex set of r ( £ iv(z/t>’ )) is necessarily also 
an element of the vertex set of the allocation graph of any larger truncated 
economy in the sequence. The tv — economy is assumed to be irreducible 
and hence, the allocation graph T(Etv(z Itv)), has a spanning subgraph, the 
vertices of which are all members of the vertex sets of the allocation graph of 
any larger truncated economy in the sequence. Since t was chosen arbitrarily, 
this holds generically for any tv. By proposition 71 therefore, the full economy 
is irreducible.
Burke (1988), and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) prove the ex­
istence of competitive equilibria in infinite dimensional economies assuming 
irreducibility of the full economy alone. However, as the following exam­
ple illustrates, an economy which is C-irreducible may not be the limit of 
any non-trivial sequence of truncated C-irreducible economies, that is, C- 
irreducibility does not imply sequential C-irreducibility.
Exam ple 72 There are time periods t =  1 ,2 ,.... , N0, where No is the number
of elements in any countably infinite set (see Simmons (1963) page 34-35).
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In each period t there are two commodities, l =  It, 2t, and one individual,
sets, Zl =  {z  : z[t >  —1, z[t, >  0, fo r  all t' /  t, zl2t >  0, for  all t} for t. 
Additionally, there is an individual i — 0 bom in period t =  1 with preferences 
u° =  z°l: and feasible trade set, Z° =  {z  : z°t > —1, z°t > 0, fo r  all t}. At 
all prices p £ A + / { 0 } ,  the price graph of this economy is a spanning cycle 
and the economy is therefore C-irreducible. A competitive equilibrium for  
this economy is a pair (p*,z*), where p‘t =  (1,0) for all t < K0, p j0 =  (1,1), 
z*1 =  (zll =  — l ,z j{+1 =  1 ,z tf  =  0 fo r  all It ±  It, It +  1) for t < K0,
f o r  all =  — 1 , 0 =  0 f o r  all t /  K0). However, the infinite economy
cannot be approximated by any increasing sequence of finite C-irreducible 
economies. By definition, truncating the economy involves removing vertices, 
and therefore arcs. Removing arcs from a spanning cycle disconnects the 
graph, and therefore any truncated economy, En, fails to be C-irreducible.
The following proposition provides a sufficient condition on the set of price 
graphs r (E (p ) )  of economy E  at all prices p G P  so that a C-irreducible 
economy can be approximated by a sequence of truncated C-irreducible 
economies. First, we need the following notation. Let I =  { / i , / 2, ■••} be
2 *° =  (¿J® =  1, zìi =  —1, f o r  all t, z$  =  0 fo r  all t >  1), 2*N° =  (z jf0 =  1
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a collection of non-empty finite subsets / „  of I, with /„  n  /„- =  0, u „ /„  =  I. 
Let V  =  {Vi,V2,...}  be the corresponding partition of the vertex set of the 
price graph r(E(p)).  For any n =  1 ,2 ,..., let L" C L be a set of com­
modities such that Z' C A", for all i €  Un'<n/ n. Let Ln =  DjL), and let 
E n =  { / ” , Ln, (Z'n,u'n) : i 6 / " } ,  be the associated truncated economy, with 
r „  the associated price graph at pn.
D efinition 73 C ondition  7\ (Sufficient arcs condition): For each price 
vector p € A+/ { 0 } ,  there exists a partition of A, A  =  {A j, A2 , ...}, such 
that Tn -  (Vn, A n) is a strongly connected subgraph of F(E(p)). For any 
n =  1 , 2 , (i) There exists an arc from Vn to Vn+i, and from Vn+l to Vn, (ii) 
If i, j  6 I n and there exists a path between vl and v} in T{E(p)), then there 
exists a path between v, and vj in Tn.
Note that the economy described in example 72 fails to satisfy the suf­
ficient arcs condition. An example of an economy which does satisfy the 
sufficient arcs condition is the Samuelson overlapping generations economy. 
In his model, a generation of individuals is born each period and lives for two 
periods. There is one commodity in each period. Individuals are endowed 
with 1 unit of the commodity in the first period of their lives, and derive util­
ity from consumption in both periods. The key restriction of the sufficient
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arcs condition, applied to overlapping generations economies, is that there 
must be enough arcs across individuals in different generations.
P roposition  75 Suppose that for all prices p € P, T(E(p)) is such that the 
sufficient arcs condition is satisfied. Then, if E  is C-irreducible, it is the limit 
of some sequence of truncated C-irreducible economies (E n : n =  1, 2...).
P roo f. We construct a sequence of truncated C-irreducible economies 
that converge to E. Let I =  { / i , / 2,...}  be a collection of non-empty finite 
subsets / „  of / ,  with In n 7n< =  0, Un7„ =  I. Let V  =  {Vi, V2, ...} be the 
corresponding partition of the vertex set of the price graph T(E(p)). For any 
n =  1,2,..., let Lj C L be a set of commodities such that Z' C A", for all 
i € Un-<n7„. Let Ln =  HjL],  and let En =  { / " ,  Ln, (Z in, uin) : i 6 / " } ,  be the 
associated truncated economy, with the associated price graph at pn. By 
construction , Ln Ç Ln+l, UnLn =  L. Therefore, (En : n =  1,2...) converges 
to E . As r(£ '(p )) satisfies the sufficient arcs condition, T„ =  (Vn,A „) is 
strongly connected, for all n. By construction the sequence (rn : n =  1,2...) 
converges to r(£ '(p )). ■
Despite the possible failure of a C-irreducible economy to be sequentially 
C-irreducible, it is nevertheless sufficient for existence to assume that the full 
economy is C-irreducible, without requiring that the sufficient arcs condition
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hold. Following Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991), we can modify each 
finite truncated economy in the sequence by perturbing the utility functions 
and net trade sets of individuals, such that each modified truncated economy 
is C-irreducible, and the perturbation vanishes at the limit. Note that, if we 
were to perturb only individuals’ net trade sets, this may involve infinitely 
many commodities. It is then rather involved to show that the perturbation 
vanishes at the limit (Burke (1988)). However, by perturbing both utility 
functions and net trade sets, we are able to perturb net trade sets along one 
dimension only, thus simplifying the limiting argument.
The modified truncated economy E'n is obtained by perturbing funda­
mentals as follows,
um’i(z<) =  «*(*"’* +  i * l )  for * £ / "
Z**  =  Z* -  ±Tj+1 for i S / " / { " }
Z 'n ,n _  Z n  _  l j j
Since ul is weakly monotone, u'” ’1 is strictly increasing in commodity 
i. Individual i <  n can supply positive amounts of commodity i +  1 and 
individual n can supply positive amounts o f commodity 1. Therefore, each 
modified truncated economy is C-irreducible, and a competitive equilibrium 
for E'n, (p*n,z*n-/JV), exists. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991) show
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that the limit of the sequence ((p*n, /<V))n=i,... is a quasi-equilibrium for
the economy E.
P roposition  76 If the infinite dimensional economy E satisfies C l — C4, 
A2, and A4 — A6, and in addition is C-irreducible, then a competitive equi­
librium exists.
P r o o f. Under assumptions C 1 —C4, .42, and .44-.46  a quasi equilibrium 
(p*, z*1) for the economy exists (see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991)). 
.42 guarantees that at a quasi-equilibrium there is at least one individual i 
for whom 3z' 6 Z' s.t. p'z* < 0. Consider the partition of the set of vertices 
of T(E, zml), { V 1^ 2} such that V 1 =  (i;* : 3z' 6 Z' s.t. p'z' < 0}, and 
V2 — {vj : $z' € Z' s.t. p*z* < 0}. Note that, by definition of a quasi­
equilibrium, Vi»,- 6 V 1, z "  e Z*(p*).We prove that V 2 is empty. Suppose by 
contradiction that V2 is non-empty. By assumption the graph r (E(p ’ )) is 
strongly connected and so, by lemma 5, there exists an arc from V { to V 2, 
and an arc from V 2 to V 1. It follows from the definition of C-irreducibility 
that there exists Vi € V 2 and Vj e V 1 such that —Z ' n &  (p*) -fi- 0, with 
i € / ,  j  £ I  and for any / '  C /  such that t € there is some m e I/I' 
such that — Z 1' n 4>m(p) ^  0- Since individual j  is utility maximizing at z ‘ l , 
it follows that there is an mo € /  such that vmo € V 1. But then, there exists
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a sequence of individuals (m i, .... mK) such that each vmk £ V la.nd the arcs 
Vk-\Vk, vkvi, h =  1, K  exist. Therefore e  V 1, a contradiction. ■
5.4 Conclusion
The main implication of the results proved in this section is that assuming 
C-irreducibility for the economy E  is a weaker assumption than assuming 
sequential C-irreducibility, and therefore when working with infinite dimen­
sional economies it is much less restrictive to prove the existence of compet­
itive equilibria by imposing C-irreducibility on the full economy alone. Note 
that by using the graph theoretic characterization of irreducibility, the re­
sults of this section extend to irreducible exchange economies with countable 
sets of individuals and commodities. In particular, assuming irreducibil­
ity of the full economy, E , (Burke (1988); Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 
(1991)), is weaker than assuming irreducibility of the truncated economies, 
(En : n =  1,2,...), (Wilson (1981); Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980)).
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